THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Is the Church of England too Middle Class?

Five hundred Cambridge undergraduates heard this question debated in the Union Debating Chamber during a recent discussion on the problem of 'Presenting Christianity to the Modern World'. It must be admitted that many of the answers were conventional and took too little account of the great change in the social structure of the country which has taken place in the last fifteen or twenty years. The audience itself was drawn from a very wide variety of social and racial groups—symbolic in fact of the Anglican Communion in the new Commonwealth. What has to be remembered is that since the war the middle-class has ceased to be a synonym for the 'better sort' of the Edwardian era, and now includes about half the nation. The Anglican Communion has lost ground to Rome among the old middle-class, but gained instead a firmer hold among those groups who were Nonconformist or even Rationalist at the beginning of the century. It has driven its roots deeper into the social structure of the nation. Our leaders need a greater awareness of long term social tendencies at work in the country and Commonwealth. They need above all a greater agility in using the new means of communication such as T.V. for putting their message across to people who have never dreamt of coming to church. After all, the symbol of working-class culture in our own age is now not the factory chimney so much as the T.V. mast.

The Anglican Ministry

Perhaps the most pressing problem in the life of the Anglican communion throughout the world, is that of the recruitment and maintenance of a full-time ministry. In the recently published survey of the life and work of the churches of the Anglican communion (*The Moving Spirit,*

Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly), this question is repeated on almost every page. There would seem to be no diocese which is, in the opinion of the Bishop, adequately staffed, and the educational level of the clergy leaves much to be desired.

The reason for the shortage of men for the Ministry is, to a large extent, an economic one. The training of a clergyman, if it is to be adequate to the demands of the job, must be at least as thorough as that of any other professional man, and this means a long and expensive education. In most of the African countries, education is now making great strides, and a University degree is increasingly common for Africans in the professions. This demands of the Church the provision of a similar standard for the clergy if the presentation of the Christian faith is to win the acceptance of the educated classes.

But it is at this point that the Church is faced with an almost insoluble problem. Advanced education is expensive, and the financial reward in every other profession is in proportion to the outlay. It is natural therefore that families look with disfavour upon the Ministry because it is poorly paid. 'As in other parts of Africa, the number of candidates for ordination is far below requirements. The main obstacle is the small wage which can be paid to priests, and this is reflected in the low educational standard of many of the clergy. In West Africa, the average pay of a priest is about £160 a year, whereas if he were engaged in teaching he would begin at £600 and rise to £1,200. In East Africa the position is somewhat similar. How then is the Church to teach the educated African when it has only a semi-educated ministry?' (*The Moving Spirit*, page 72).

There are three possible lines along which this problem can be tackled. Some would advocate a celebate priesthood, but it must be remembered that celibacy is quite foreign to the traditions of Africa, and the experience of the Roman Catholics there is not at all encouraging. The second suggestion, put forward some time ago in a pamphlet by Bishop Newbiggin of the Church of South India, is for a part-time Ministry to supplement the full-time clergy. Well-qualified men, who were found suitable, would be ordained but continue to earn their living in other professions. The third solution is the obvious one of asking the churches to support the Ministry adequately. A combination of the second and third method is probably the most likely. The question underlying this problem is whether a poor and under-developed country can afford to pay well-qualified, educated priests in sufficient numbers to meet the pastoral needs of the population. There must be more research on this from the sociologists and the Church historians.

But the situation is desperate and is bound to continue to deteriorate unless drastic steps are taken now. This must be one of the main subjects for discussion at the Lambeth Conference.

The Meaning of an Oath

Canonical obedience is becoming fashionable again. In the past the Church of England has sat loosely to such law and authority as it had and has not seemed any the worse for doing so. Whatever may be the true cause of our present distresses, they cannot be attributed to that. Now it is the movement that more than any other grew and flourished by disregard of authority, the Anglo-Catholic, that is most insistent upon it. Frankly, this does not make a good impression. The people who most exalt the principle of spiritual authority are the ones to have found that it breaks down on the granite of reality. There is a lesson to be learned from this, and it is not the authoritarian one.

At his ordination a man takes two oaths. First he swears an oath of allegiance: 'I, A.B., do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen Elizabeth II, Her Heirs and Successors, according to law: So help me God.' This is accompanied by an oath of Canonical Obedience: 'I, A.B., do swear by Almighty God that I will pay true and canonical obedience to the Lord Bishop of C., and his Successors, in all things lawful and honest: So help me God.'

What do these oaths imply? Both are solemn and comprehensive. Suppose that a conflict arises between them, which takes precedence? How far do they require and how far are they justified in requiring that a man surrender his own power of moral decision? Can any man properly surrender that power? If a man finds there are edicts of authority that he cannot obey, at what point does honour demand that he withdraw from the institution and resign his Orders?

Until recently men have not experienced these questions as personal dilemmas. They may become increasingly serious in the future. The kind of problems men may have to face is indicated by the present marriage controversy, which is important, not only in relation to the happiness and spiritual well-being of the people who are affected by it, but also as a test case. Ever since the explosion over a clergyman who married a divorced woman, one bishop after another has been telling his clergy to act in accordance with the notorious directives of the Convocations. The 'lawfulness and honesty' of these directives are not held to be in doubt. Yet for many clergy they are.

Some find here a conflict between the two oaths. Canonical obedience requires that they refuse marriage to divorced people, while allegiance requires that they exercise their own discretion. Some feel, also, that what the Bishops and the Convocations demand is in itself wrong; that in some instances they would be guilty of sin if they turned away a couple asking for their marriage to be celebrated in church. We are being told now that such thoughts are rebellious and not to be entertained. Are men who act on their principles in this matter to be made to feel that they cannot remain in the Church of England without disloyalty?

At the Nuremberg Tribunal, it was explicitly accepted that superior orders could not be pleaded in mitigation of an offence against humanity. The same principle is now acknowledged in the armed forces of this country. For the sake of the ethical interest the military authorities are willing to take the risk to discipline that is involved. It is wrong that any man should surrender his conscience to the care of another. If there is any unpardonable sin, surely that must be it, for the man who does so is abandoning that which distinguishes him as a moral being. Whatever the necessities of loyalty and obedience may be, reservations must always remain. Provision must always be left for the occasion when a man should say, 'Here stand I.'

If canonical obedience means something different from this, the oath should never be taken. In the sense in which it can rightly be taken, the oath should mean a statement of loyalty to the Church as symbolized in the person of the Bishop as its commissioned representative. This is a very different matter from submission in detail. What we are moving towards is a situation in which the Bishop is to his clergy in the same relationship as an abbot to a monk, standing to him in the place of God. But in a large measure the Reformation was fought precisely on this issue. The time that has elapsed since then has not invalidated the principle that a man is directly answerable to God and, in the last resort, to none other. If there is such a thing as a judgment seat before which we shall one day be accused, we should feel very feeble if our only defence was, 'Please—I did it because the Bishop told me,' or 'because of the majority in Convocation.'

Current theories of the Church as an organic, corporate body, the extension of the Incarnation, are largely responsible for the confusion of thought on these questions. We are reverting to an era when the individual had no significance of his own but only as a unit in the Church community. The Church was always right: if the individual disagreed he must be a sinner—to the stake with him! It is still true that the individual owes his significance to the institutions to which he belongs, but he is a responsible person as well. The Church is a free association of responsible people in relationship with God in Christ. The emphasis must be equally and fairly distributed.

What looks well in theological argument often looks tawdry in the day-to-day realities of life. The Church may be the Body of Christ, but that truth should not be interpreted to mean that it always has the mind of Christ. A bishop is an ordinary, fallible human being. It is to be hoped that he, like the Convocations, will seek the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But a majority of one in the Convocations is not a guarantee that the vote embodies the divine inspiration. It may mean no more than a group of fallible men have been exercising their fallibility.

ANGLICAN-PRESBYTERIAN RELATIONS

By Rev. Norman Sykes, F.B.A., Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge

The Joint Report[1] of the commission of Anglicans and Presbyterians, which has been commended to the study of all members of their respective Churches by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and by the Provincial Convocations of the Church of England, is a document which should command the earnest and prayerful consideration of all Anglicans. Students of Church history indeed are well aware of the fluctuating fortunes of Episcopacy and Presbyterianism in North Britain during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as of the attempt made by the Long Parliament and the Westminster Assembly to Presbyterianize the Church of England. It is not unfitting to recollect how nearly a constitutional episcopacy became the norm of the Church of Scotland during the seventeenth century, how closely in the thought and practice of Robert Leighton it approximated to the 'Bishops-in-Presbytery' of the present Report, and how unfortunate was its association with the Stuart dynasty in mingling political with ecclesiastical elements which led ultimately to its final dispossession after the Revolution of 1689. All this, however, belongs to past history; and the authors of this Report are wise to set aside these 'old, unhappy far-off things and battles long ago' by their observation that they have renounced 'the method of selecting and measuring such faults and errors in the past history of the Churches now conferring as might be judged to be responsible for our present divisions'.

One of the first and most important characteristics of the Report therefore is its forward-looking aspect. It is concerned with the future unity of the Church; and especially it emphasizes the need for 'the fuller manifesting of the Church's wholeness' and 'the greater fullness of the Church that is to be'. Therefore it begins with an examination of the theological considerations underlying and governing the practical achievement of union; and it is essential for the understanding of the practical recommendations that this pregnant, though short, survey should be carefully studied. It is only after doing this that the reader can profitably pass to the question, which the commissioners set themselves, of ascertaining whether there are 'conceivable modifications and mutual adaptations of the two Church systems whereby they may be reconciled in such a plenitude of faith and order as will conserve the fullness of their traditions?' Nevertheless, since attention and discussion will be centred chiefly in these recommendations, it may be permissible to pass to them without

[1] *Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches.* S.P.C.K., 3s. 6d., 1957.

further ado, but with the repeated warning that they rest upon and flow from the antecedent theological considerations.

Both sides accepted the principle of *episcopé*, 'which includes pastoral care, the continuance of the ordained ministry through ordination, and the guardianship of truth and exclusion of error'. Differences naturally occurred when the forms in which this *episcopé* is to find expression were examined. 'From the Anglican side it was clear that full intercommunion and unity could not be realized apart from Episcopacy. From the Presbyterian side it was clear that full intercommunion and unity required a movement of mutual adaptation, including full recognition of the corporate nature of the ministry and of the exercise of *episcopé* in the parish ministry of Word and Sacrament.' A brief, but important, sketch is given therefore of the salient features of *episcopé* as exercised in the Presbyterian and Anglican traditions respectively. These considerations led to a welcome measure of agreement. 'On the Presbyterian side, there was a willingness to consider the functions of a Bishop, as they are recognized by the Anglican Communion, so long as the office was duly integrated with the Presbytery and the whole Church. The concept of a presiding "Bishop-in-Presbytery", exercising functions in relation to ordination and pastoral oversight as a Father-in-God to ministers and congregations, with authority given to him by consecration at the hands of Bishops as well as with the authority of the collective Presbytery, appeared to be a possible modification of the Presbyterian polity. The Anglican representatives, moreover, were anxious to emphasize that the Bishop's office is rightly exercised only within the context of the corporate life of the whole Church, a principle which has been too often obscured in practice. There was a further willingness on their part to consider the complementing and strengthening of the working of the episcopate in the Anglican Churches by ensuring the corporate functioning of *episcopé* through developments within the existing order corresponding to the sacral courts of the Church as found within the Presbyterian order. In short, over against the possibility of the acceptance of the "historic episcopate" by the Presbyterian churches, there was set the possibility of the acceptance of a greater measure of "corporate episcopacy" by the Anglican Churches.'

This lengthy quotation from the Report is essential in order to make clear the background against which the specific suggestions for modification of existing Church polities are set. It will be equally proper and profitable, moreover, to concentrate attention on the application of these principles to the Church of England, leaving Scottish churchmen to consider their acceptability to their own Church. It is proposed therefore that in the Church of England 'lay persons would be solemnly "set apart" for some measure of pastoral responsibility towards their fellow-Christians, in an office akin to the Presbyterian eldership. Lay people would be given

appropriate participation in the government of the Church at all levels: parochial, diocesan, provincial and national. The integration of such lay persons with the Bishop and presbyters in diocesan synods would greatly strengthen their authority and importance by fulfilling the doctrinal requirement that decisions of the Church must be made by the whole Church, by the Body of Christ in its entirety. This could perhaps be done by assimilating the functions of the existing Diocesan Conferences more closely to those of a diocesan synod'. Whilst the position of the episcopate as an Upper House of the two Provincial Convocations would continue, it is suggested that 'steps would be taken to include or associate with the Convocation of each Province a House of Laity. Further, efforts would be made to procure a wider and more effective lay representation in the Church Assembly, and to revise the relationship between the Convocations and the Church Assembly viewed as a National Synod'.

To these agreed proposals, the Presbyterian members of the Conference added further observations. They realized that the desired modifications would have to be affected through the reform, not the abolition, of existing Anglican institutions, such as Parochial Church Councils, Ruridecanal Chapters and Diocesan Conferences; 'and possibly through the reform of the Diaconate; but they would like to be sure that the laity and the presbyterate were fully linked with the Bishop in the doctrinal and spiritual decisions of the Church, and that the Church had such independence in spiritual things as, for example, to be able to reform its liturgy, or to have its Bishops appointed on the recommendation of the Church, including lay representation'. Furthermore, 'the Presbyterians would desire the Episcopalians to lay greater stress on the parochial incumbent's prophetic office of preaching the Word . . . This might lead to a change of emphasis in the present system of ministerial training'. Finally, 'Presbyterians would regard it as desirable that large bishoprics be divided into units capable of being adequately pastored by a single Bishop. This would go a long way toward commending Episcopacy to Presbyterians in accordance with their own stress upon the pastoral and sacramental office in the Church'.

It will be readily granted that the realization of this ambitious programme would keep the Convocations and the Church Assembly occupied for more than the remainder of this present century. Moreover, it is possible to differentiate between the importance and value of the several recommendations. Undoubtedly the weakest link in the Anglican polity is that of the laity; and the realization of the proposals to raise the Anglican laity to a parallel position of responsibility and participation in Church government at all levels would constitute an intrinsic boon to the Church of England. For, with the decline in numbers of the ordained ministry, a greater weight is being placed upon the shoulders of the laity; and if Parochial Church Councils could be developed and their personnel trained

to a corresponding position with that of the Presbyterian lay eldership, the gain to our Church would be evident. It would be widely agreed further that our present Diaconate is a fragile link in that threefold order of ministry, which the Preface to the Ordinal traces to apostolic times and affirms to be necessary to the Church. Its contemporary status and usage as a waiting-room to the priesthood, and therefore of as short duration as can be contrived, is far from satisfactory. Whether it could be combined with the 'lay-eldership' in some form is a more difficult question, and one which deserves careful study. Nor would a majority of Anglicans deny that a more thorough training in, and emphasis upon, the prophetic office of preaching the Word as part of the ministry of the Word and Sacraments to which our clergy are ordained, is both desirable and beneficial. No doubt C.A.C.T.M. and the conference of Principals of Theological Colleges would have much to contribute to a discussion of how this suggestion could be realized.

It is a matter of common knowledge that an Archbishops' Commission on Synodical Government and on the desirability of giving to the laity a fuller part in the government of the Church in all its aspects, is reaching the conclusion of its deliberations and should shortly present its Report. It will be proper, therefore, to await this Report in order to see if, and how far, it approximates to the recommendations of the Anglican-Presbyterian Commissioners in regard to the position of the House of Laity *vis à vis* the Provincial Convocations, and the relationship of the latter to the Church Assembly. It is probable, however, that a majority of English churchmen would echo the desire of the Presbyterians 'to be sure that the laity and the presbyterate were fully linked with the Bishop in the doctrinal and spiritual decisions of the Church'. At present the means of such association lie in the Lower Houses of Convocation, with their right of a final assent or negative on resolutions of the Upper Houses, and in the right of the House of Laity in the Church Assembly to a final veto on measures proposed by the House of Bishops. Doubtless the principle here accepted is capable of further development. Likewise the suggestion of a greater degree of spiritual independence of the Church must depend on the fuller integration of the laity in the English ecclesiastical polity. It is natural also that the Presbyterian tradition should lay much emphasis on the division of dioceses, since it has always been their claim that their pastor was more like the primitive bishop of a single flock or city than the large territorial Anglican diocese allowed its bishop to be. But there are two caveats to be entered here. First, that the city-bishopric was not the only type known to the Early Church; and secondly, that from the standpoint of the responsibility of the Bishop to the Universal Church, especially in regard to the guardianship of the faith, a multiplicity of small bishoprics is by no means of self-evident advantage to the Church. In General Councils, ancient and modern, the tradition of great

sees has been a stabilizing influence of real importance; and it is, to say the least, doubtful whether the Presbyterian emphasis on the city-bishopric does not lose sight of the oecumenical relationship of the episcopate. It is difficult, for example, to envisage the kind of episcopacy which would result from the conversion of each English archdeaconry into a diocese. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the position of the Suffragan-Bishop in the present Church of England has many anomalies, notably the expedient by which some Suffragan-Bishops obtain seats in the Lower Houses of Convocation, from which they are properly excluded by the definition of these Houses as comprising 'the inferior clergy'. But these practical issues will need much careful thought and experimentation before satisfactory solutions can be envisaged. It will suffice for the moment to give a warm welcome to this Report, to commend it cordially to the careful study of the Church, and especially to admonish the Anglican laity to fit themselves for such further responsibilities as may be laid upon them. Finally, however, attention should be drawn to the truly eirenical and oecumenical character of the Report. If the unhappy consequences of past history are to be overcome and the future union of the Churches of England and Scotland to be effected, the temper and recommendations of this Report will go far to point the way to a consummation devoutly to be wished. In this connection also, great importance should be attached to the need for giving practical expression to the interim recommendations for interchange of pulpits and the occasional practice of intercommunion. By these means the rank and file of both Churches (who include clergy no less than laity) will become more familiar with the *ethos* and personnel of the Churches of England and Scotland, and this mutual growth in understanding will prepare the way for the further steps towards full unity and intercommunion.

SOME IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGICAL ISSUES

By The Rev. W. Norman Pittenger, S.T.D., Professor of Christian Apologetics, General Theological Seminary, New York, U.S.A.

In this essay I shall discuss some of the theological problems which face Christian thinkers at the present time, in their never-ceasing task of making the essential Christian message, in its integrity, relevant to the men and women of our time. These issues have been put to us by the vast increase in historical, critical, scientific and other knowledge during the past century. And despite the devoted labours of a large number of thinkers throughout this period, the fact still remains that the Christian theological enterprise has not yet reached what one might call a 'settlement' with the new knowledge. Especially to-day, in the middle of the century, we are witnessing a recrudescence of a kind of 'fundamentalism' —whether it be biblical, credal, theological, or ecclesiastical—which to many of us seems to be a rejection of the efforts of the past century of Christian thought and a return to an obscurantism which is either very simple (as in biblicist groups) or highly sophisticated (as in many of the so-called 'neo' movements), but which in any event represents a retiring of Christian theology from its high responsibility of speaking to men in the idiom of their own time and with a generous if critical recognition of the new truth which God has willed us to learn in the past hundred years.

Perhaps the first major problem has to do with the place of the Bible in the Christian tradition. The revived interest in Scripture and the renewed—and rightful—insistence on its normative rôle in faith have made our understanding of and use of the Bible a question to which attention must be turned. In the Anglican Prayer Books it is said that no doctrine is to be believed, as 'necessary to eternal salvation', unless it can be 'proved' from Scripture. This is the general position of all the reformed Churches. 'Proved' was, of course, the Elizabethan way of saying 'tested'. This statement about the place of Scripture I believe to be profoundly true. It is our safeguard against the proliferation of dogmas which may so affect the emphasis or balance of Christian faith that the historic witness of the Church is endangered or even lost.

But we are not obliged, I think, to try to work out a 'biblical theology' in anything like the sense which is so often advocated to-day. Indeed, I very much doubt whether there can be a 'biblical theology' in that sense. As Dr. F. C. Grant has argued in his book on *New Testament Thought*, there are emphases and convictions in the Scripture, arising from the response of men (in all their historical 'conditioning') to the impact of God upon them and upon their history as they believed this to have occurred; but they are not always easily reconcilable one with another.

Despite the strained and artificial attempts to develop a systematic 'biblical theology', so popular and so various in our time, it would seem that a fuller recognition and use of what biblical and historical critical study has disclosed should make clear that what matters here is the *overall* biblical view, the persistent motifs which run through the Old Testament and find their fulfilment or completion in the New, the great affirmations of faith which in varying fashion are expressed by the biblical writers. We are bound to refer to the Bible anything that claims to be essential to Christian belief, but I doubt if there is a *single* 'theology' which emerges from the Scriptures.

The Bible is the record of the revelation of God *as responded to*. It remains normative for us, in the sense that a response of that *type* and *style*, congruous with and even germinally present in the Scriptures, is necessary if we are to claim continuity with the tradition of which we are a part. This delivers us from the vagaries of thought which appeal to one generation or another, but it does not put us in a kind of biblical strait-jacket which makes any development impossible.

The present fashion in so much theology drawn from the Bible seems to me to involve a disregard of the results of biblical critical studies so soon as one comes to theological construction.

One way in which this expresses itself is the discussion about the biblical 'world-view'. Here I believe we are greatly in need of a careful discrimination between the scientific outlook of the men of the Bible and their inevitably 'mythological' ways of stating man's position in the world, on the one hand, and the essential truth which in and under this idiom is being stated by those men, on the other. The former is plainly quite incredible; the latter would seem to be of the very essence of Christian faith. What is this essential truth? I should sum it up in these terms: God is creator of the world and of man; God is purposively at work in nature and history; man is the creature of God, yet radically sinful; God seeks to bring men into—and because of sin that means restore men to—their right and authentic life with him; in Christ he moves to accomplish this end through an historical event in which he involves himself with singular intensity; men, by nature living in community, are thus restored in a new community whose centre is the living Christ, present still with his people; yet human life is incomplete in this world, and hence a gift of God, 'eternal life', is required for its completion and fulfilment. Something like this, I think, is what is essential in the biblical picture.

Bultmann's project of 'de-mythologizing', which more correctly should be described as '*in*-mythologizing', is concerned with this whole problem. We may not like the way in which Bultmann proposes to state the results of his analysis; it savours too much of a particular school, dated at that, of existentialist philosophy. But so far as the problem itself is concerned, Bultmann has put the right questions; and many of our contem-

porary theologians have, it seems to me, evaded them in their fear of having to give up what is often, despite their protestations, a reliance on a literalistic view of Scripture.

The problem of biblical interpretation leads us directly to the creeds of the Church. These can have authority, surely, only in so far as they are based on the biblical record. And a new attitude to that record, with a new way of regarding its language and its intentions, means that the creeds themselves must be seen in a new way. I doubt if this is as widely recognized as it ought to be. The Apostles' Creed, and *a fortiori* the so-called 'Nicene', cannot any longer be imposed rigidly on the ground that they are simply summaries of Scripture with theological corollaries. These creeds are statements, in terms appropriate at the time of their promulgation, of beliefs basic to the Christian life. But they are statements which in our own day need re-interpretation in ways appropriate to our new knowledge, both historically and scientifically, and also (I should say) philosophically, if they are to remain relevant and meaningful. They are indeed classic statements of the faith, but they are not binding in the sense that what has been styled their 'literal construction' can be accepted without interpretation.

One consequence of our whole contemporary situation should, I believe, be a change from theologies of divine 'interference' and 'intervention' to a theology which sees God as the ground of all existence, the living God who is everlastingly creative and who in this world is cause and sustaining purpose in all that is. We have come to see that through this or that constellation of events in the realm of historical happening, and the apprehension and assimilation of these by men of faith, God brings about conditions which enable his human children to understand his nature and his plan. In such a context, Jesus Christ cannot be seen in isolation as a divine 'intrusion'; he is rather the culmination, coronation, and correction of all that has gone before. Here God has brought about the supreme condition in which a right response may be made to him, a response which occurs in the community of the faithful and which has implications not only for this life but for eternal destiny.

The way for such a theological understanding was prepared centuries ago in the ancient patristic conception of the *Logos* or Word of God. That Word, Self-Expressive Divine Activity, is unceasingly at work in the world and more particularly in the lives of men and their historical situations. Man, in his rational, moral, and spiritual nature (now indeed distorted by sin) is the potential vehicle for this divine Activity in peculiar and special fashion. Christ is in fact this potentiality become actual through the divine governance. In him, as Athanasius said (speaking more wisely than perhaps he knew), the Word has an *organon*—an adequate living and enduring organ or means of expression—for the specially concentrated and focal self-manifestation of himself in the affairs of men.

But that same Word is also the cosmic Word, through whom all things came and come into being, by whom they have been and are sustained. Thus Christ is the meeting-place, not exclusively but decisively, of man's life and God's purposive Activity. He is *the* Incarnate One in a world whose nature through and through, and especially in the sphere of history, is incarnational since in it and through it God by his self-expressive Action works towards the fulfilment of his purpose. The acceptance of Christ as this focal point is, of course, an act of faith; but it is through that act of faith in him, and through its consequences, that the life of man receives significance which as Christians we believe to be normative for man in his Godward relationship. And since response to the Word, anywhere and always, and supremely response to the Word 'en-manned' in Jesus, is through the Spirit—the great 'Amen' made through redemption and also through creation to the 'uttered' Word of God—we are enabled to work towards a view of Godhead which is properly trinitarian, both in regard to the outward actions of God and also in regard to his inner life.

Thus we may say that, even had man not sinned, the Christ-event would have occurred. In historical terms, we must be Scotists at this point. But since man has in fact sinned, the Christ-event is not simply the crowning of the divine-human relationship intended 'from the creation of the world'; but is also, and centrally for us men in our sin, the bringing into our human realm of the grace which is effectual in restoring men to their status as consciously and gratefully responding sons of God. In this way Incarnation and Atonement are a unity, with the Cross literally crucial for men, since through it as the supreme act of obedience unto death of him who is focal in the God-man relationship, the redemption or life-fulfilling of men by God is made a fact for us. It is 'placarded', as St. Paul says, for our acceptance and apprehension, a response which is made through the Spirit who says 'Amen' in our spirits.

This which we have just been summarizing is not in biblical language. But it is a way of understanding and stating the meaning of the Christian faith in Jesus which is drawn from the biblical record, makes sense of that record, and is yet in an idiom that is in accord with the way of understanding the world learned from the whole scientific-philosophical movement of the past half-century (and especially from the so-called 'process' thinking of our time). We are thus led to a related problem which has been shelved by many theologians, but which still presses for an answer. It has to do with 'miracle'.

The importance of this matter is not so easily dismissed as those would have us think who say that Christianity cannot concern itself 'with what Jones will accept'—Jones being, of course, a non-believer who is to be won to Christian faith. Our concern is not with 'what Jones will accept', but rather with what is the actual state of the problem in the light of biblical

study as well as in view of our accepted knowledge of the world. Let me say at once that I am not now speaking of the appearance of the unprecedented and novel, the unexpected and surprising, in history and human experience. That such does occur and that through its special 'transparency' to the ground of being, it gives men faith and confidence nobody could deny. In that sense Jesus himself is a 'miracle', although he is 'miracle' in no way which denies both the fullness of his humanity and the congruity of his emergence with the totality of the divine movement in creation and history.

But 'miracle' as defended by, say, C. S. Lewis in his book of that name is a very different matter. Here is a crude, deistic notion; and it is a notion with which the whole idea of 'miracle' is commonly associated. It is plain to many of us that such an idea is no real part of Christianity, and is in fact a highly dangerous and misleading concept. It is doubtful whether the word can now be used in the sense suggested in the above paragraph; and it would appear to me that divine governance or providence, both general and special, will more satisfactorily state the residual religious significance of the whole concept of the miraculous.

We must of course be on guard lest we fall into the error of eliminating the stories of the miraculous from the gospels, leaving only the religious and ethical teaching of Jesus. For the gospels give us *as a whole* the total impression of Jesus, and they are our only historical datum for the interpretation of his person as well as for our knowledge of his human career. The miracle-stories have their place in this total picture, not because there is sufficient evidence to convince us that they all occurred as reported, but rather because they convey to us, in terms proper to the thought of those who knew him at first-hand, a vivid testimony of his character and his work. Jesus made upon those who knew him in the 'days of his flesh' the impression of One immediately related to God his Father: it is this to which the stories of the miracles in the Synoptic Gospels give witness. That evaluation of Jesus is essentially our own, as we who are living the life in Christ by faith through grace consider who this can be, by whom we have received what we dare to call 'eternal life'. What actually happened, in detail and in literal fact, we cannot recover or know; and the high probability, as Dr. Sanday said many years ago, is that the stories which are *contra naturam* are to be credited to the telling of the life of Christ rather than to the events about which the tale is told.

Certainly the virginal conception and the empty tomb—which are not identical with the Incarnation, which is a religious judgment of the significance of Christ in and for faith, and the Resurrection, which is the assertion of his victory over sin and death—are in a somewhat different position from the other miracle-stories. They are, so to say, 'worked upon' Jesus rather than done by him; and the stories about them have a place as testimony to that evaluation of him which we affirm in the words

'Incarnation' and 'Resurrection'. The evidence for these stories is hardly very high on any ordinarily valid historical grounds; both show obvious signs of being early Christology and apologetic. But they have the same value as the other miracle-stories, in that they give us testimony to the impression Jesus made upon his followers and the primitive Christian community.

Since he was so plainly for them a special act of God, he must have been conceived miraculously—this was the way some of the early Christians seem to have reasoned. Since he had indeed conquered death and made himself known to them as alive, in all his risen power, the tomb must have been empty—so again the early Christians seem to have reasoned. The faith remains, even if the particular legends used to convey it cannot be accepted as certified historical fact. Thus the faith in Christ is truly an evaluation of him as part of a commitment to him, in terms of religious understanding and apprehension; his earthly life, either in its beginnings or end, did not and does not, for no earthly life could, demonstrate or prove his divinity. The stories of the virginal conception can be seen as a way of stating his special importance in the Christian *saga*, through a story which has only meaning when it is understood as Jewish-Christian haggadah. The stories of the empty tomb can be seen as early, very early apologetic of the Christian disciples or their immediate successors for the conviction, born of vivid and compelling experience, that though Christ had died, yet he was alive in the integrity of his full personality as One available for the faith of those who believe in him to the end of time.

Now all of this brings us to another issue of great importance to-day—the nature of religious language. Our trouble comes when we attempt to turn the symbolical or metaphysical language of religion into literal and univocal predication. Yet poetry is truer than prose, for it is 'truth with wings'. The imaginative language of religion, both as to the historical sources of our faith and also as to the articulation of that faith, is vital, vivid, personalistic, not abstract, rationalistic, and scientific. It is therefore of great significance that so much attention is being given these days to the problem of religious speech. But here I believe that a too indiscriminate use of certain catchwords has caused great confusion, not only for theologians but also for the layman. I suggest, therefore, that we insist on the general metaphorical (or, if you will, 'mythological') nature of religious language, but that we reserve the term 'myth' for stories whose historicity is entirely irrelevant since they are concerned either with absolute beginnings (the creation tale), with absolute endings (the apocalyptic and even eschatological statements), or with universal truth (the story of the fall). Furthermore, I suggest that we use the word 'saga' for the historical events as narrated to us in Scripture, through which events God was believed to have acted in the realm of the historical for the salvation

of men (Exodus, in the Old Testament; the life of Christ as a whole, in the New Testament). And finally, I suggest that we use the term 'legend' to denote those embroidered, fanciful stories attached to the saga, embodying some elements of history in certain instances but not in and of themselves historical in the stricter sense (the nativity stories, etc.). Such words, and the discriminations which they will impose upon us, will help to order aright the material we possess; this will give to our study of origins and our statement of faith a sounder basis and a better proportion.

My line of thought will appear highly dangerous to some readers, I know. But I may as well confess that the line I take is close to that of the so-called 'Catholic Modernists', especially thinkers like George Tyrrell and Ernesto Buonaiuti and the *earlier* Alfred Loisy. I cannot see anything blasphemous in admitting that mistakes have been made in the past. The Church has never failed to insist on the essential things—the *gospel*; but it has often mistakenly stated these things and, through no fault of its own, embroidered them with unimportant and even, as we should now say if we were really honest about it, 'untrue' ideas and beliefs.

This leads directly to the problem of the authority of the Church, which is another important question in our own day. That authority, surely, is not oracular, as Roman Catholics and many Anglican Catholics have presumed to assert, but is the trustworthiness of the community of those who (living the life in faith through grace) have given consentient testimony to the belief that in Christ a deed was done such as I have described; and that in consequence of this deed a certain way of seeing life, human and divine, necessarily follows. Hence the Church teaches with authority or trustworthy insistence that God is trinity-in-unity, that the human life of Jesus is by divine prevenience and human consent the instrument for God's focal self-expression among men, that through Christ men are restored to life with God and empowered for living it, that there is a community of faith where all this may be known and shared, that through participation in that community through initiatory sacrament (Baptism) and sacramental communion with Christ (the Lord's Supper) men receive the 'benefits' of their Lord in vital fellowship with him and the brethren, that sins are forgiven through God's grace, that God has 'prepared for those who love him such good things as pass man's understanding'.

These might be called 'dogmas', for they are that without which the whole Christian life by faith in grace could not be lived at all. These, not dubious historical details or peripheral *aber-glaube*, are central. These are what Christians do actually believe; these are what they are concerned to defend. And this is why the ecumenical problem is so important in our time.

For only through a united Christian Church can we genuinely hold this faith, in all its richness and with all the variety of ways of holding it which its very richness demands. Here questions of the meaning of ministry and sacraments inevitably arise; here differing understandings of tradition, of worship, of life, are found. I have no room to discuss such matters in detail; I can only say that the solution of our problems in this regard depends upon an attitude of openness and charity, coupled with a recognition of the values in the several different modes of seeing the Christian life and its articulation in such ways as the ministry. In this respect, I think the Church in South India has pointed the way to us all.

But I believe that the theological issues to which I have referred are very real. We have had a generation of return to the ancient confessions and theologies. This has been good, for it has restored to us both the feeling for Christian continuity and the sense of walking essentially in the same paths as our Fathers. We have had a generation or more of return to the Scriptures and their normative place in the Christian tradition. This too has been good, for it has restored to us the feeling for our basic Christian stance in the whole series of events and their interpretation which is at the heart of our faith. Now the demand is laid upon us to venture forth, once more, to the task of reconception and restatement. No one can do this alone, nor can any one Christian communion. It requires the varying emphasis and differing witness of all the now fragmented parts of Christendom to accomplish so great a task. That is a final, and nowadays often forgotten, reason for seeking Christian unity.

CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN THEOLOGY

A REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

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The century and a half that divides the Edict of Milan from the death of Pope Leo in 461 is among the great periods in the history of the Church. Christianity achieves the position of a world religion, which it has never again lost. Not only are fundamental doctrines given lasting definition at Nicaea and Chalcedon, but Christian missions carried the faith beyond the bounds alike of the Mediterranean world and the Roman Empire. Britain, north-western Gaul, the Rhineland and Ireland on the one hand, the kingdom of Axum, the Himyarites in southern Arabia, Armenia, and parts of Persia come within the frontiers of the Church. But the very fact of becoming the official religion of the Roman Empire produced new strains within the Church, among which was the divergence between Eastern and Western interpretations of doctrine and ethic. Not the least important of these differences concerned the relationship between the Christian Church and the State.

Canon Greenslade is among the outstanding authorities on early Latin theology in this country. His contribution to the Library of Christian Classics[1] is a carefully chosen selection of the writings of Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose and Jerome. These are woven into the central theme of the Western doctrine of the Church before Augustine, and linked to this, the relationship between the Church and contemporary society. The use of extracts from some longer works has also allowed the inclusion of relevant material from Irenaeus and also Tertullian's *De Pudicitia*. Short, but adequate introductions to each author and each work places the development of the Western viewpoint throughout the period 200—400 A.D. in its historical setting. Textual and literary problems are explained in brief, scholarly notes. The translation is in an excellent terse and idiomatic style. Not the least valuable part of this book is the bibliography. The work reflects great credit on the scholarship of the editor, and is a very useful introduction to one of the main problems confronting the Latin Church before Augustine.

Canon Greenslade's decision to concentrate on the doctrine of the Church is fully justified. It has meant indeed the sacrifice of Novatian and Hilary, but as Harnack pointed out,[2] if the West represented by Tertullian contributed some valuable formulae for the doctrine of the Trinity, the main interests of both clergy and people lay elsewhere. Even Hilary had never heard of the creed of Nicaea before he was exiled to Phrygia.[3] At

[1] *Early Latin Theology*, edited and translated by S. L. Greenslade, D.D. Vol. V in the Library of Christian Classics, London S.C.M. Press, 30s., 1956.

[2] A. Harnack, *History of Doctrine* (*Eng. Trans.*, 1910), ii, 236.

[3] Hilary, *De Synodis*, 91 (*Pat. Lat.*, X, 545 A).

Rome as late as 417 (Pope Zosimus) the canons of Serdica were being mistaken for those of Nicaea.[4] Donatus of Carthage, despite his Trinitarian views earning the censure of Jerome as 'in agreement with Arian doctrine', was never condemned for heresy.[5] His Catholic opponent, Optatus of Milevis, does not so much as mention his doctrinal lapses. In the West, schism and the definition of the nature of the Church were the primary questions. Conversely in the East, while statements on the doctrine of the Church, such as those of Origen in the *Discourse of Heracleides*[6] are weighty, they tend also to be incidental. The concern is with Trinitarian and Christological questions. It is interesting that in the controversy of 255–256, which Canon Greenslade documents from the Western point of view, Dionysius of Alexandria was judging the issue on quite different grounds from Cyprian and Stephen.[7] His concern was with the validity of baptism given by a heretic, while the latter disputed about baptism given in separation from the Church.

Ultimately, the difference of approach to theological issues can be traced back to the last thirty years of the second century, to the fate of Montanism in East and West respectively. Montanism was the first of the provincial schisms which resulted from the extension of the Church to a purely native population. It combined Judaistic rigorism with a Phrygian religious background. But whereas in Asia Minor, outside the Phrygian highlands, the prophetic and Chiliastic tendencies of the Montanists represented a dying cause even in the period 170–200, in the West, particularly in Africa, they became the predominant characteristic of the Church. In the view of Tertullian and of those other representatives of primitive African Christianity, the martyrs Perpetua and Felicitas, the Church was a brotherhood under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit awaiting the Second Coming. Fasting, penances, ascetic practices, and preparation for martyrdom were the hall-marks of a Christian's life. Church and world were separate and antagonistic. Philosophy was the 'theme of worldly wisdom'.[8] There could be no concord between Athens and Jerusalem. The stern, unbending rigorosm of Tertullian set the tone of African and thence of Western Christianity. The doctrine of the

[4]L. Duchesne, *The Early History of the Church* (Eng. trans.) iii, 171.

[5]Jerome, *De Viris Illustribus*, 93. Donatus' work 'On the Trinity' was 'Ariano dogmati congruens'.

[6]For instance, his appeal to the 'universal custom of the Church' on the form of the Anaphora 'to Almighty God through Jesus Christ' (*Discourse*, Eng. Trans. *Library of Christian Classics*, ii, 440), and his rejection of outside interference in the affairs of the Church by unauthorised persons (*ibid.*).

[7]See K. Müller, 'Kleine Beiträge zur alten Kirchengeschichte, No. 9', *Zeitschrift für die N.T. Wissenschaft*, 1924, 242.

[8]Tertullian, *De Praescriptione*, 7. See C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, Oxford, 1940, p. 224 ff.

Church as defined by Cyprian, Donatus and even by Hosius and Ambrose is part of his legacy.

In the East, the failure of Montanism left the way open for a more liberal tradition, derived ultimately from philosophic Judaism, to assert itself. The contrasting outlooks of Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria need no further qualification. But the ideal of Clement and some of the Greek apologists, such as Justin and Melito of Sardis, of the gradual progress of mankind through the agency of the Logos towards complete reconciliation with God was furthered by the development of secular theories of kingship such as those of Dio of Prusa and Aelius Aristides.[9] The gradual assumption by the Emperor in the eastern provinces of the Empire of the sacred character of a Hellenistic monarch prepared the way for the time when a Christain could see a Christian Roman Emperor as the manifestation of the Divine Monarchy on earth. To Tertullian a Christian Empire was absurd.[10] To Origen it could be a natural stage in human religious progress.[11] So, in the East, from Melito onwards,[12] Christian Apologists pointed to the fact that Christ, the Prince of Peace, was born at the moment when Augustus was bringing peace and unity to the Roman world. The philosophy of history is perfectly expounded by Eusebius (*Praeparatio Evangelica* i, 4).[13]. 'It was the work of ineffable and divine power that at the same time with His Word, and side by side with His teaching of the monarchy of the One God who is over all, he should have freed mankind at one stroke both from the polytheism of the influence of demons and from the polyarchy of different nations . . . When Christ came, of whom it was said of old by the prophets, "There shall arise in his days righteousness and fullness of peace, and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares," there followed upon his coming works according to what they foretold. All the polyarchy in the Roman world was ended, and Augustus became sole ruler at the same moment that our Saviour was manifested.' Thus there is no hostility between Church and State. The enemy, polytheism, is characteristic of the national states which the Empire superseded. Peace was only possible under Monarchy. So, the conversion of Constantine marks another great step

[9]See the interesting extracts of Hellenistic authors on the subject of kingship in second century A.D. collected by Sir Ernest Barker, *From Alexander to Constantine,* Oxford, 1956, pp. 305, 307, 327.

[10]Tertullian, *Apol.* 34 and elsewhere in the *Apology*. From Celsus (Origen, *Contra Celsum*. viii, 71) it appears that in the East Christians were already envisaging a Christian Emperor. See C. J. Cadoux, *The Early Church and the World*, 1955, p. 268.

[11]Origen (*Contra Celsum*, ii. 30) notes, like Melito, that the peace brought about by Augustus coincided with the Incarnation. He looks forward to the moment when all men will be of one religion and one language (*ibid*. viii, 72).

[12]Melito of Sardis, *ap*. Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* iv, 26.7.

[13]I have quoted Barker's translation, *op. cit.*, p. 474. See also, Eusebius, *Demonstratio Evangelica* (ed. Heikel), iii.2.37, and iii.7.30.

forward in the history of mankind. The Church had prevailed against all that human and demonic powers could do. Now, the imperial monarchy inspired by true religion reflected the Divine Logos on earth. Eusebius' greeting to Constantine in the *Tricennial Oration* of 336 as 'king (basileus) beloved of God receiving and bearing the image of His Supreme Kingship',[14] was not mere idle flattery. It was the logical consequence of a firmly-held philosophy of history characteristic of Hellenistic Christianity for more than a century. This entailed, however, a complete identity of Church and Empire. The Emperor was supreme in both temporal and religious matters. The sanctity of his office and person was upheld at every point by the Church. No wonder that Constantius II could tell the bishops assembled at Milan in 355, that what he esteemed right should be considered as a canon,[15] and about the same time could order the Princes of Axum, whose territory lay beyond the bounds of the Empire, to extradite Anthanasius' friend Frumentius, since he was not instructing them in true religion, and this was the Emperor's concern.[16] In the East Caesaro-Papism was a reality founded on a clear-cut theory of Church-State relations. The contrasting fates of John Chrysostom and Ambrose of Milan are eloquent of this fact.

Canon Greenslade's work enables the general reader to trace the development of the contrasting theory of the relationship between Church and society in the West. The first two selections, from Tertullian's *De Praescriptione* and the *De Idololatria* already show the chasm which separates Tertullian from his contemporary Clement of Alexandria. Contempt for the pagan world and its wisdom, the restriction of the Christian from contact with it, and the legalistic interpretation placed on the concept of idolatry, these are the hall-marks of the Church of the Elect as Tertullian understood it. The Church was an exclusive body whose membership was determined by their sacramental purity rather than by their adhesion to an episcopally governed congregation.[17] Cyprian's *De Unitate*, written in 251, and the letters relating to the Baptismal Controversy, show a shift of emphasis. The Church is still an exclusive body, and 'The Bride of Christ' and Noah's Ark are two of Cyprian's favourite types of the Church. Baptism, meaning the complete renunciation of the world and reception of the Spirit, is the only and all-important ceremony of Christian initiation. As opposed to the Roman practice, there is no evidence for Confirmation in the African Church in the third century.[18]

[14]Eusebius, *De Laudibus Constantini* 1.6 (Barker, p. 478-497). See also, E. Petersen, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem*, Leipzig, 1935, pp. 50 f.

[15]Athanasius, *Historia Arianorum*, 33. See S. L. Greenslade, *Church and State from Constantine to Theodosius*, London, S.C.M., 1954, pp. 31 ff.

[16]Athanasius, *Ad Constantium Apologia*, 31.

[17]Tertullian, *De Pudicitia*, 21.

[18]See G. W. H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit*, Longmans, 1951, 170 f.

Imposition of hands was no substitute for baptism (Cyprian, *Ep.* lxxii, 1). But the Church is now a Church of the bishops. 'The Church was in the bishop and the bishop in the Church',[19] and Cyprian himself was to bequeath to his successors the idea of the martyr-bishop. The spiritual and administrative attributes of a Church leader were amalgamated in him and perpetuated by his death. What difference was the conversion of Constantine going to make to this standpoint?

At this point it must be questioned whether the editor's final decision to omit all reference to Optatus of Milevis and move on to Ambrose was justified. It might indeed be argued that after Cyprian, North Africa no longer plays a leading part in formulating the ruling ideas of the Western Church. There is a gap of about eighty years, from the death of Cyprian in 258 until the emergence of Pope Julius as an arbitrator between Athanasius and his enemies, when the West lacks any effective representative. Caecilian and Donatus tended to cancel each other out at Carthage, while the long pontificate of Silvester, 314–335, coincides with the nadir of the influence of the see of Rome in the settlement both of doctrinal and disciplinary questions.

Nonetheless, the transition to Ambrose is abrupt. Too much happened in the 120 years that separates him from Cyprian. Interesting, is how Western Christianity split on the question of the relationship between the Church and the new Christian Empire. The nearest approach to the acceptance of the Eastern interpretation of the new stiuation comes from Optatus of Milevis, *De Schismate Donatistarum* iii, 3, writing on behalf of the African Catholic minority. He tells his Donatist opponent, Parmenian, *circa* 365, that 'the State (respublica) is not in the Church, but the Church is in the State, that is, the Roman Empire which Christ in the Song of Songs calls Lebanon'. The Roman Empire was the protector of the priesthood and the Christian virtues.[20] But this view comes from people whose very existence depended on Imperial favour, and is not representative of the West as a whole. To the Donatists, Constantine's conversion made the difference only that the Devil switched his attack on the Church from force to guile. The tremendous requisitory by Petilian, bishop of Constantine, *circa* 400, on the subject of the influence of kings on the history of the Church (preserved in Augustine, *Contra Litteras Petiliani* ii, 92, 202)[21] would have been well worth including. Petilian asks, ' But what have you (his clergy) to do with the kings of this world, in whom Christianity has never found anything except envy towards her. And to teach you shortly the truth of what I say: A king persecuted the brethren of

[19]Cyprian, *Ep.* 66.8 (Hartel, p. 733).

[20]Optatus, *De Schismate Donatistarum* iii.3 (ed. Ziwsa, p. 74).

[21]Translated in Marcus Dods' ed. of Augustine *On the Donatist Controversy*. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1872, 363-366.

the Maccabees . . . ' There follow a long list of victims of royal persecutions, Daniel, our Lord Himself, and the victims of the persecutions from Nero to Diocletian, and then, without a break, to those of the more recent Imperial measures of repression in favour of the African Catholics. This was, however, not merely a hymn of hate. Behind Petilian's diatribe lay a theology based on suffering and penance and a philosophy of history that demanded that the righteous should suffer from eternity to eternity.[22] There is no attempt to harmonize Church and World within a single framework achieved through the creative power of the Divine Logos.

That Petilian was only expressing in a violent form ideas of Church-State relationships which prevailed in more orthodox minds is clear from the events following the Council of Milan in 355. It was on this occasion that Hosius of Cordova, who more than anyone in the West might be counted as a supporter of the Constantinian House, rejected Constantius' substitution of the Semi-arian in place of the Nicene formula. 'Do not use force, write no letters, send no counts . . . ', he writes. 'Cease these proceedings, I beseech you, and remember that you are a mortal man . . . God has put into your hands the kingdom; to us he has entrusted the affairs of the Church.'[23] Here is the classic statement of the dualism between Church and State. 'Render unto Caesar . . . ' is quoted for the first time in political theory. It was echoed in even more strident a form by Lucifer of Cagliari, and finally by Hilary. All the elements of the Ambrosian attitude had existed in the West decades before the massacre of Thessalonica.

The climax of Canon Greenslade's work is, of course, the translation of Ambrose's letter to Valentinian II (*Ep.* 21) and those referring to his relations with Theodosius (*Epp.* 40, 41 and 51). They show the great bishop of Milan at his worst and at his best. In the affair of the synagogue of Callinicum in 388 we see him as the bigoted upholder of clerical intolerance against the requirements of ordinary civil justice. Two years later, he lays down a position for all time that the acts of a ruler are subject to the restraints of moral law, and that moral law is represented on earth by the Church. One feels he could only have achieved this by maintaining consistently that the 'emperor is within the Church and not above it'.[24] The people of Thessalonica may not have died in vain.

The final, well-chosen selection from Jerome's Letters gives a picture of the ascetic movement in the West. Here, too, one notes the contrast between the two halves of the Empire. In the East, monasticism represented a great popular surge of religion Coptic or Syriac in character. In the West, asceticism flourishes in aristocratic Roman households. It is

[22]See the present reviewer's *The Donatist Church,* Oxford, 1952, 320-321.

[23]Athanasius, *Historia Arianorum* (*Pat. Graec.* xxv.748).

[24]The phrase is used in Ambrose's *Sermo Contra Auxentium,* 35.

partly at least a movement of Escape. It is symptomatic of the fact that the Empire in the West was on the verge of collapse. In the East, even Syria and Egypt were not to be lost for another 250 years. Interesting, also, is Jerome's assertion of the essential equality of the episcopate (*Ep.* 146). 'Wherever there is a bishop, whether it be at Rome or at Eugubium, whether it be at Constantinople or at Rhegium, whether it be at Alexandria or at Tanis, his dignity is the same and his priesthood is the same'—a strange, but revealing dictum from one who had been the intimate of Damasus.

There is one minor passage that deserves comment. Does the phrase 'missam facere' used by Ambrose in his letter to his sister Marcellina really mean 'celebrate mass'? (*Ep.* 20, Greenslade, 210). In the Christian Latin of the time *missa* still had the meaning of 'honourable release'. Examples may be quoted from Commodian, *Carmen Apologeticum* 77, 'Stat miles ad missam', and Rufinus' translation of the *Clementine Recognitions* iii, 50, describing St. Peter as 'multitudinem missam facit'. Surely all that Ambrose is saying, is that at the moment when Valentinian's officials were entering his church he was 'in the act of dismissing the catechumens' before offering the Eucharist?

So we come back to the final question, why did the Eastern and Western theologies of the Church diverge so strikingly? There is one clue in Canon Greenslade's introduction and footnotes to Tertullian's *De Idololatria*. He follows Professor Elmslie and draws attention to similarities between the prescriptions to be found there and the almost exactly contemporary tractate of the Mishnah, *Aboda Zarah* (Idolatry).[25] This is important, for when one comes to look closely at some other aspects of Tertullian's moral theology we find that, hater of the Jews though he is, it is the Judaistic standpoint that he was defending against a more liberal and enlightened Christianity that was developing both at Rome and in the East. Thus, the famous 'three chapters' of idolatry, murder and adultery which he asserts against Callistus in the *De Pudicitia*[26] that the Church cannot forgive, are precisely those transgressions against Torah which Akiba and other second-century Rabbis had defined as justifying martyrdom in order to avoid performing.[27] A Jew was not required to lay down his life for lesser reasons. The issue goes much deeper than mere scrupulosity on Tertullian's part. One notices, too, how deeply the influence of Maccabaean and post-Maccabaean literature, such as the Book of Enoch, has penetrated African theology, particularly on the subject of martyrdom and the relations between Church and society. It is not only

[25]W. A. L. Elmslie, *Texts and Studies*, viii.2 (Cambridge, 1911).

[26]Tertullian, *De Pudicitia*, 21.

[27]L. Finkelstein, *Akiba, Scholar, Saint and Martyr*. New York, 1936, 260-261. For opposition by Rabbis to martyrdom for lesser reasons, J. H. Greenstone, *art. Martyrdom (Restriction of), Jewish Encyclopaedia.*

Tertullian who draws his inspiration from these sources.[28] In the Great Persecution, the example of Eleazer the scribe (II *Macc.* vi, 18 ff.) is the one that comes naturally to the mind of Secundus, bishop of the hill-settlement of Tigisis, as representative of his own conduct.[29] The martyrs of Abitina also claimed to resist torture, 'after the principles of the Maccabees'.[30] Razis (II *Macc.* xiv, 42) becomes a justification of suicide as equivalent to martyrdom.[31] Even the clubs of the Circumcellions are dubbed 'Israel' or 'Aziel'.[32] One might justly compare the outlook of African Christians with that of the Essenes. There is nothing parallel to this in the East after the end of the second century. On the other hand, the theology of Clement and Origen stems naturally from the philosophic tradition of Hellenistic Judaism. Time and again characteristic Origenistic doctrinal views and Scriptural interpretations lead back to Philo.[33] In the West, there seems to have been a complete absence of philosophic Judaism. This fact, however, and even the background of the primitive Semitic religion of Saturn Baal-Hammon would not account for the parallels between African Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism. It looks as though in the first two centuries A.D. Essene and Rabbinic Judaism dominated in the North African *Diaspora* in the same way that philosophic Judaism dominated the Synagogue at Alexandria and Antioch. It is interesting that in his study of Judaism among the Berbers in Roman times, Professor Marcel Simon states that, 'L'Afrique tient dans les écrits rabbiniques une place plus grande que n'importe quelle autre region de l'Empire.'[34]

It is not possible within the scope of this note to follow up this line of inquiry. One of the great missing links in the study of early Church history remains the origin of the organization and inspiration of the Church in North Africa. The discovery of these origins will be of fundamental importance for an assessment of Western theology. It is perfectly clear, however, that the dualism between Church and State does not cease with the Constantinian revolution. Tertullian, Cyprian, Donatus, Ambrose, Gelasius, Hildebrand and Becket mark the successive phases of the unfolding of a single Western tradition. The contrast with the thesis of Clement, Eusebius and the Patriarchs of Constantinople could

[28]Tertullian, *De Idololatria*, 4, 9 and 15.

[29]Augustine, *Breviculus Collationis cum Donatistis*, iii.13.25. (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* xliii, 639).

[30]*Acta Saturnini* 16, (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* viii. 700B).

[31] Augustine, *Contra Gaudentium*, 1, 31, 36 (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* xliii. 728).

[32]Augustine, *Enarratio in Psal.* 10.5. (Migne, *Pat. Lat.* xxxv. 134).

[33]See, for instance, J. Daniélou, *Origène*, Paris, 1948, 180 ff. and J. Crehan, 'The Dialektos of Origen and John 20.17, *Theol. Stud.*, xi (1950) 368-372.

[34]M. Simon, 'Le Judaisme Berbère dans l'Afrique ancienne', *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, 1946, 1-31 and 106-145, at p. 24.

hardly be greater. There is no parallel to the Investiture controversy in Byzantium. Canon Greenslade has performed a great service in bringing important texts on the formation of the Western doctrine of the Church within the scope of the general reader. The problems of Church and State remain with us. This excellent work shows how both history and theology are necessary for an intelligent understanding of them.

RECENT PHILOSOPHY AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

By the Rev. F. H. Cleobury, Ph.D.

The object of this article is to consider three works of philosophy.[1] Clearly some limitation of scope is imposed on me, for they cover an immense field. I shall assume that what most readers of the *Modern Churchman* would wish to know is to what degree they witness to a reaction by professional philosophers against the extreme anti-Christian position taken by many of the earlier analysts. I referred to this reaction in the *Modern Churchman* for December, 1955, and I have begun to notice that even the outside world is belatedly becoming aware of it. But the process is slow. Only a few days ago a provincial university student attending one of my services told me that she was going to read philosophy, 'Of course, all the philosophers are atheists.' Doubtless a hasty impression, which time will correct. But it is still widespread.

When philosophy in the English-speaking world took a new direction under the influence of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein forty or so years ago, it was not long before three trends of argument, all hostile to Christianity, were given great emphasis. First there was the attempt of the logical positivists of the twenties and thirties to dismiss as meaningless all 'metaphysical' statements, including statements about God. Second, there came the denial that sentences about right or wrong conduct were statements of fact. If I say, 'That was a very wrong thing to do,' I am not, on this view, making a statement which agrees or disagrees with any state of affairs outside the field of human emotions or attitudes, and which therefore can be true or false. I am merely expressing my feelings, as when I say 'Oh!' or am taking up an attitude, or am exhorting people to do what I want them to. Third, there came the attempt, known as 'logical behaviourism', to equate statements about mental or conscious processes to statements about bodily ones.

These are definite attacks on the Christian faith. Some would deny this, and tell us that the analytical philosopher is merely applying a cer-

[1] *Faith and Logic*. George Allen & Unwin, 1957. *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*. George Allen & Unwin, 1957. *Words and Images*, by E. L. Mascall. Longmans, Green & Co., 1957.

tain method, with no motive other than the clarification of thought or the resolving of puzzles. But this would be to confuse the ideal with the actual; we are living in an imperfect world. It did not need Freud to tell us that men can be dominated by motives which they do not admit; it did not need the existentialists to tell us that a man's attitude to ultimate questions is a commitment of his whole personality, and not a detached act of pure thought. All this was known to the insight of the Biblical writers. He would be credulous indeed who would regard it as a pure coincidence that the three trends I have mentioned—which represent quite central and important features of the philosophic landscape to-day —are in effect denials of what Kant saw as the essence of religious belief—God, moral responsibility and immortality. Language about God had no meaning. Statements about right and wrong revealed nothing but human attitudes, and therefore our moral consciousness could not reveal the will of God and our responsibility to Him. Statements about conscious events like thinking and loving and willing were *really* (i.e. could adequately be translated into) statements about bodily activities and dispositions, and therefore the idea that human personality could survive the death of the body was nonsense. I propose to consider these three trends in the light of the works before us.

The attack on metaphysics took the form of an assertion that all significant factual sentences (sentences, that is, which are not overtly or covertly exhortations, exclamations, commands, etc.) can be exhaustively divided into two classes—(1) sentences the truth or falsity of which can be decided by examining their logical form, and thus seen to be *necessarily* true or false; (2) sentences which purport to convey information about happenings in the real world and which can be verified or falsified by sense-experience or experiment. At the outset it was alleged that since statements about God fell into neither class, they were 'metaphysical' and meaningless.

But this short and easy way of disposing of God was soon seen through. Consider the sentence, 'Statements which cannot be verified by sense-experience are meaningless.' Is this *necessarily* true? Does the contradiction of it land you in self-contradiction? Clearly not. Is it itself verifiable by sense-experience? Clearly not. It is therefore, on your own showing, meaningless as a statement of fact. The new doctrine, therefore, was seen to be nothing more than a *proposal* to give the word 'meaning' a new and unusual meaning—a proposal to which there is no reason for agreeing. But a further reason for rejecting the doctrine began to emerge. *Can* we avoid 'metaphysics' even if we wish to? In his work, *Philosophical Analysis* (O.U.P. 1956), J. O. Urmson points out that the early work of Wittgenstein pre-supposed a doctrine of 'logical atomism' which was itself a metaphysic. There was no way of verifying it in experience. 'But it is clearly undesirable to derive an anti-metaphysical

principle from a metaphysical doctrine in this way.' Once this was seen, there followed other attempts to define philosophy so as to exclude metaphysics, i.e. all pre-suppositions non-falsifiable by events. But with what success?

In two of the essays in *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, the point is dealt with. C. A. Mace, writing on 'Some Trends in the Philosophy of Mind', shows that mental events are inevitably described in terms of 'models'. For example, Descartes used the model of 'The substance and its states'. For Locke, the model was 'the container and its contents'. And G. F. Stout once remarked that James Ward talked about the 'I' as if it were an 'Eye'. Mace comments that 'all these models tend to be visual, and when we visualize them clearly they all look absurd. But not one of them is entirely absurd. Each draws attention to something of interest and importance. Absurdity results when some irrelevant features of the model are attributed to whatever is modelled'. This seems to me a most penetrating observation, and the whole essay will repay study. S. Körner, in his essay in the same volume, 'Some Types of Philosophical Thinking', makes what I think is essentially the same point. All our thinking, he says, including scientific thinking, is carried out in obedience to metaphysical 'directives' which we give ourselves. They are 'metaphysical' in the sense that they are too ultimate to be verified or falsified by events. He instances the basic divergence between Einstein and Born over the antithesis of law and chance. (The point, I think, is that any sequence of events, however often repeated, can be ascribed to chance, while equally any sequence of events, however unusual, can be affirmed to be the expression of law. In neither case can the affirmation be falsified experimentally.) Körner points out that a large part of Kant's work can be regarded as an attempt to make explicit hidden metaphysical directives to which *all* rational beings are committed.

The vital point made in these two essays is that the use of *some* model, the following of *some* directive, i.e. the acceptance of *some* metaphysic, is inevitable. You have to make *some* metaphysical assumption before you can begin to talk of verification or falsification by events. If we try to exclude metaphysics by defining philosophy as the study of the way we use, or operate with, sentences, we fail. For if this study includes decisions that some forms of factual sentence are preferable to others—preferable from the philosophical and not merely from the literary standpoint—this must mean that they describe more adequately whatever it is that language is about. And since philosophy is admittedly not an experimental science, how can philosophers discuss whether one form of words is more adequate in this respect than another except by appealing to some model? And if the analyst denies that his job is to decide that some sentences are preferable to others in their objective reference, how

is philosophical language-criticism to be distinguished from literary criticism? Is it worth bothering about, anyhow? The fact is, we cannot talk significantly about sentences at all unless we pre-suppose the existence of people who use the sentences to communicate their thoughts to one another and describe the world in which they live. But this is to pre-suppose a complex ontology, i.e. a doctrine of being, which cannot be verified or falsified by any particular events; in short, a metaphysic. For if I choose as my model a solipsistic one—the view that I alone exist and that all my sensations are *merely* sensations and witness to no existence outside myself—no sensation can, in the nature of things, falsify my view.

Now the 'model' which concerns us here is the God-model, and a point of great importance clearly arises. Are there no rational grounds on which one model or one directive is to be preferred to another? Is it merely a question of making an arbitrary choice where reason cannot help? There are two references in *Faith and Logic* which bear on this. Basil Mitchell, in his essay 'The Grace of God', speaks of our adopting 'some device for co-ordinating our experiences—this being a deeply-rooted instinct (the metaphysical instinct?)'. Now 'co-ordinating' here suggests that the criterion for accepting a model is the *order* it produces in what would otherwise be chaos—some measure of system, unity and coherence. This is one of many indications that philosophers are being forced back to doctrines which the earlier analysts had rejected out of hand with their rejection of all constructive philosophy. (Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* begins by assuming absolute plurality or atomism—entire absense of connection). J. R. Lucas, in his able essay on 'The Soul', is even more explicit on the point. He writes, 'we are motivated by a general nisus towards the greatest simplification of our thought and discourse, and unification of our conceptual structure'. But to expose the basic directive of all human thinking, a directive which we obey but did not create, is surely to give a key to reality. Our intellectual 'demand' for law rather than chance, system rather than chaos, is not *merely* a demand. It is an insight.

So far, in answering the charge that belief in God is not verifiable by sense-perception, we have, in effect, replied 'What of it? Belief is still reasonable.' But a second answer is possible, and valid. We can insist that the assertion of God's existence is *not*, in principle, unverifiable or unfalsifiable in human experience. The first chapter of Dr. Mascall's *Words and Images*, after a most penetrating criticism of A. J. Ayer's use of the verification principle, shows how contentions of certain contemporary philosophers show, progressively, an approach to the second answer. John Wisdom of Cambridge and R. M. Hare of Oxford appeared more or less willing to argue on the basis that Christians will not allow any fact to falsify their belief, but in defence of Theism they pointed that it nevertheless makes a vast difference to a man—and, presumably, to his

reaction to life—whether he believes in God or not. Wisdom said that the difference as to whether a God exists involves our *feelings*, and 'in this respect is more like a difference as to whether there is beauty in a thing'. Hare pointed out that theistic belief is much more than a detached intellectual acceptance. But G. B. Mitchell went further. He would not accept the charge that Christians allow no fact to *count* against the assertion that God loves men. Clearly there are facts which do count. But they do not count enough. The Christian's faith, based on the Christian experience, is strong enough to bear the strain. If asked what happenings would convince him that his faith was a delusion, he refuses to answer. He will not put God to the test.

But *is* this the Christian's final answer? Would Christian experience be sufficient to sustain such a faith for ever if the facts continued to challenge it for ever—if there were never to be a verification? Here Dr. Mascall quotes I. M. Crombie: 'Could anything count decisively against the view that God is merciful? Yes, suffering which was utterly, eternally and irredeemably pointless.' This is implied by the New Testament doctrine of the hereafter. The love of God is manifested in his offer to men of eternal life, and in such a world as this could be manifested in no other way. Our resurrection-life is guaranteed by Christ's. If Christ be not risen, and if, therefore, we shall not rise, then is our faith vain. If there were no hereafter, suffering *would* be pointless. Of course, we cannot, in the nature of things, demonstrate by experiment here and now that we shall survive death, but this is not a *logical* or *linguistic* inability to verify survival; it is merely a *practical* difficulty. Those who verify to themselves their survival of physical death cannot (unless the spiritualists are right) communicate with us. But even in their first fine careless rapture, the positivists admitted that for an assertion to be meaningful it need only *in principle* be capable of verification. It was not held that verification must be a practical possibility.

A comparison of the arguments of Wisdom, Hare, Mitchell and Crombie brings out, Dr. Mascall shows, a point of enormous importance. A. G. N. Flew pointed out that if we rely on the Wisdom arguments alone, what started as an assertion of fact—that God exists—is reduced to the mere status of a 'picture preference', and that if we rely on the Hare argument alone, 'no cosmological assertions about the nature and activities of a supposed personal creator' are involved. Mitchell and Crombie, however, insist that theological utterances about God are cosmological assertions; God does exist, objectively and independently of our existence. But this insistence is all the more necessary because a well-known British philosopher has gone to the length of claiming that to be a Christian does not involve the acceptance of this objective interpretation of Christian utterances. In *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief* (C.U.P. 1956), R. B. Braithwaite interprets statements about God as ellip-

tical statements about men's experiences and attitudes. His view may be illustrated by two quotations: 'I myself take the typical meaning of the body of Christian assertions as being given by their proclaiming intentions to follow an agapeistic way of life.' He agrees that a religious assertion has a propositional element that is lacking in a moral assertion, in that it will refer to a story as well as manifest an intention. But this is only the telling of, or the alluding to, the story 'in the way in which one can tell, or allude to, the story of a novel with which one is acquainted'.

Two of the writers in *Faith and Logic* may be quoted as illustrations of the way in which Christian philosophers on the whole have reacted to this. Austin Farrer, in his essay 'The Examination of Theological Belief', discusses the relation between belief in God and the Christian conception of the claim which our fellows have on us. Doubtless with Braithwaite in mind he deals with the suggestion that 'we have all that we require if we set ourselves to feel for our neighbours *as though* they were creatures, etc., of an infinite living goodness'. He points out that this 'makes all theology ridiculous by the implied assumption that religion is *essentially* the discharge of finite obligations by invoking an infinite metaphysical credit. But no one who believes in any religion will agree to this for a moment. The inadequacies of our finite equipment for our finite tasks are some slight signs and tokens of our relation to God, but that relation is far more important for its own sake than for its supplementation of human defects'.

I. M. Crombie, in his valuable discussion of 'The Possibility of Theological Statements', is equally forthright on the point. He refers to a suggestion of 'sophisticated apologists' that 'credal affirmations may, without significant loss, be treated as equivalent to recommendations of the behaviour and attitudes that we are agreed on all hands to be their proper corollaries. "There is a God" thus becomes equivalent, or nearly equivalent, to something like "Treat all men as brothers and revere the mystery of the Universe" '. This, he says, is an evasion, and he insists that Christian worship 'is thought of by the Christian as an entry into relationship with a transcendent being, whom non-Christians do not believe to be there to enter into relationship with'. Dr. Mascall, in *Words and Images*, remarks that Braithwaite's exposition seems to manifest 'an extraordinary combination of sophistication and naïvety: of sophistication in that it is the kind of position that only a highly trained intellect could devise, of naïvety in that it is difficult to see how any ordinary person (and the great bulk of those for whom Christianity is intended are ordinary persons) could think that Christianity was worth practising if he thought this position to be true'.

The root of the whole matter, surely, is this. I must either entirely refuse to transcend my private experience—to refuse, that is, to postulate the existence of anything outside it, or else believe that entities exist

independently of myself. The first course is solipsism. Now it may be frankly admitted that my refusal to be a solipsist does not, and should not, commit me to a *riot* of 'reification'. I must not, that is, think that every noun that appears in human speech stands for a separately existing entity. The positivists, indeed, have a strong case if they confine their refusal to reify nouns to impersonal nouns. Relativistic and atomic physics certainly justify a Berkeleian caution in the case of material-object-nouns and the nouns used in physics. But positivists have failed to see the vast implications of the fact that the one type of noun which we *must* reify is the person-noun. Every individual knows that other individuals who are thinking, sensing and feeling emotion exist 'outside' him. Sentences like 'William is in pain' must be taken at their face value, however justified we may be in refusing so to take sentences about alleged impersonal entities, and in interpreting them as elliptical statements about our experiences. Now the word 'God', although carrying, admittedly, a vastly different connotation from nouns standing for human beings, is very much more akin to them than to scientific or material-object nouns. Even, then, if one accepts the positivistic analysis of impersonal sentences, one can quite consistently reify 'God', i.e. allow that a transcendent God exists.

But can one *prove* that God exists? In his discussion of 'The Possibility of Theological Statements' already referred to, I. M. Crombie shows that he does not share the prejudice, so common among analysts, against natural theology, for he refers us to Austin Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* and E. L. Mascall's *Existence and Analogy*. But he does not think that natural theology can prove, 'in any strict sense of the word', that God exists. The arguments of the natural theologians, he says, only reveal the intellectual pressures which lead people to talk about God. But once we have seen that we cannot restrict the word 'proof' to the narrow sense of 'tautological' or logically necessary proof, at what point do we substitute 'pressure' for 'proof'? I might as well justify my refusal to be a solipsist by talking of the intellectual pressures which lead me to talk about other people. In the ordinary sense of inductive or constructive proof, we can certainly prove that God exists.

We now come to the second of the three analytical attacks—the denial by recent philosophers, following C. L. Stevenson, that sentences about right and wrong, and sentences using 'ought' and 'duty', are statements about objective fact, and the proposal to treat them as *merely* expressions of one's emotions and attitudes, or as veiled exhortations. In an extremely interesting essay in *British Contemporary Philosophy in the Mid-Century* by Dr. A. C. Ewing on recent devolopments in British ethical thought, he contends that 'such modes of analysis fail to give anything like an adequate account of what we mean, in the ordinary straightforward sense of "meaning", when we make what we call "ethical judgments" in our

daily practical life. We do mean to say something true, and what we mean to say is not merely what we or other human beings desire or feel as a matter of actual fact'. He points out that the Stevensonians certainly cannot claim that they are telling us what we really mean, for we are the best judges of that. Their only course is to say that the common-sense view of ethical judgments is muddled, and that they are giving the nearest view to it which can be intelligibly or consistently stated. It seems to me that this goes to the heart of the matter. The subjectivist moralist can state a case if he is prepared to say frankly that the meaning we all attach to ethical judgments is a *wrong* meaning. This will involve him in a metaphysical argument—about the relation of our thinking to reality. But he cannot win a short and easy victory for subjectivism by pretending to analyse ethical sentences.

Dr. Ewing does not, of course, claim that in showing the Stevensonian view to be inconsistent with common-sense he has refuted it. On the whole, analytical philosophers have not followed Dr. Moore in his rather extravagant reverence for common-sense, and Dr. Ewing does not claim infallibility for it. But 'it would be hard indeed to hold that all our ethical judgments are fundamentally mistaken, as we should have to hold if nothing is right or wrong in the sense in which we in our ordinary ethical life believe it to be so. Common-sense ethics may indeed legitimately be amended, but cannot surely be completely repudiated... Surely the *onus probandi* is on the sceptic, and we should only be justified in this ethical scepticism if the most rigorous arguments were available to establish it'. But the Stevensonians' account of ethical judgments 'is derived rather from their general epistemological assumptions than from a direct study of our first-hand experience'.

The simple truth is that the Stevensonians' ethical theory is based on their acceptance of a certain metaphysical model or directive. The choice was between, on the one hand, rejecting, in the light of this theory, the common-sense conviction, part of the very texture of the human spirit, that the distinction between right and wrong is no mere human preference, but is based on something objective, and, on the other hand, making one's conviction that moral judgments are objective the criterion by which any metaphysical model must be judged. The Stevensonians took the first course. Christians have every right to take the second. If any metaphysic—such as a belief that the ultimate realities are particles or bundles of energy or logical atoms or sensa—cannot house objective values, so much the worse for it. If the only way of housing them is in Objective Mind or Will, i.e. in God, so be it. And the Christian will add that the game of defending the objectivity of values is not worth the candle unless we do thus arrive at God.

The third of the attacks is the attempt to 'reduce' language about mental processes to language about bodily processes or dispositions. This

is a twentieth-century version of nineteenth-century 'scientific materialism'. With the pure Watsonian behaviourism of the early years of the century, the difficulty of most people was to understand how anyone could believe anything so silly. One's modesty at first compelled one to assume that the behaviourists really meant something subtle which eluded us, and it was with some reluctance that we were forced to admit that there existed apparently intelligent people who really thought that events like seeing and hearing were bodily processes. C. A. Mace, in his essay in *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, refers to this early crude form of behaviourism as 'a rather vulgar iconoclastic revolution'. ' There are, it was baldly stated, no minds, no thoughts, no mental images, no dreams or nightmares, no feelings, no desires. There is nothing, nothing, nothing but bodies and their responses to stimulation.'

One would have thought that once this nonsense was seen through, philosophers would have dropped the whole thing and accepted consciousness as fundamental—as the basic fact in terms of which one's philosophizing must be conducted. But this would have run counter to prejudices which have operated very powerfully this century. What actually ensued in certain quarters was a determined effort to save as much as possible from the wreck. Dr. Mace refers to the next stage as 'dispositional behaviourism'. The claim that when a man perceives, remembers, imagines, or desires, all that is taking place is that his body is acting, was dropped. There was substituted the claim that 'to perceive something . . . is to be *disposed* to behave in a certain way'. And when philosophy became explicitly analytical, the obvious thing was to claim that a correct analysis of statements about mental happenings was a statement about a bodily disposition.

But if there is nothing actual, but only a disposition, then you can discover precisely what the disposition is only by waiting to see what happens. Only when it has happened can you be sure what the disposition was. Now we clearly do not, Dr. Mace points out, have each to wait and see how we are going to behave before we know what we believe, hope or fear. What are we actually and directly aware of? The attempt has been made to show that even in these cases one is observing subtle bodily events —'somatic and kinaesthetic sensations'. But, as Mace insists, there is obviously more in it than that. 'There are not only pains in the neck. There are waves of emotion, felt inclinations, and there are trains of thought to be observed.'

He is, of course, right. To deny that I can notice that at one o'clock a *mental* event occurred—e.g. I suddenly saw the force of argument—is just silly. But I would add that even if, *per impossibile*, it could be shown that what one is immediately and directly aware of, when one introspects, is bodily happenings, one has still not banished consciousness. For one has had to use the words 'one is . . . aware'. And the 'one' in question

cannot be identified with the bodily changes of which he is aware, and the 'aware' stands, anyhow. To use an expression favoured by some analysts, it is a 'category mistake' to talk of a mass of cells thinking or inferring or having emotions.

Nevertheless, I sympathize with the dissatisfaction of philosophers with common-sense language about 'bodies' and 'minds'. The idea that two co-ordinate entities act and react on one another—machines and ghosts—has got to go. The greatest task before Christian philosophers is a correct analysis of body-mind language. Reduction of one form of language to another there must be. Man is not a sheer duality. But we have to insist that consciousness is fundamental. Language about mental events is the basic philosophical language. And when we have completed our task we shall be able to say, with full conviction, 'I believe in the *transformation* of the body, and the life everlasting.'

DAVID HARTLEY, M.D. (1705—1757) AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 'MODERN CHURCHMAN'

By Lady Kathleen Oldfield

To bring new learning to bear upon ancient faith has not been a monopoly of nineteenth- and twentieth-century churchmen, and it is sometimes thought-promoting or, at the least, entertaining to examine efforts to do it in former ages. During the eighteenth century many individuals tried their hand at it. For that 'Age of Reason', following Descartes, produced a fertile atmosphere in which to emphasize the causal aspect of the deity, with hope thereby to find that all the 'effects' of the compounded universe would follow logically from Him. Logic and human reason, however, were not generally thought to be infallible instruments of knowledge. Both Descartes and Newton emphasized that they could give no rational account of 'substance', and Locke, Berkeley and Hume, from three quite different points of view and by different arguments, limited their conception of human reason to that of an instrument of the mind for dealing with symbols. The question *what*, if any, 'reality' the symbols, perceived and constructed by the mind, might represent got pushed ever further from comprehension; but that of *how* the mind did in fact perceive remained potentially fruitful. In this way the effort to find God through natural phenomena was carried into the realm of psychology, and one of the first poineers in this quest was David Hartley—who died just two hundred years ago (August 1757).

He set out upon his scientific enquiries deliberately from a religious point of view. His magnum opus, *The Observations on Man*, whose general theme he first thought out as early as 1730 (although it was not

published until 1749), dealt first with the 'Frame of Man's Being' and secondly with his 'Duty' and spiritual 'Expectations'. He drafted the latter part first. For the principle use of his 'physiological and philosophical theory', he wrote in 1730,[1] was to give 'guidance to the art of ethics and customs' and 'to investigate the first origins of intellectual pleasures and pains and also desires and aversions; and also the motives of voluntary and semi-voluntary actions . . . ' In this way he hoped to assist the soul to good and to correct the bad, and so understand the development of the intellect that it would appear evident that we could not 'escape from agitation and restlessness nor take a stand save in loving God with all our hearts and our neighbours as ourselves'. This, it might be said, was to approach science with a preconception. But Hartley was frank about the preconception of his faith, seeking all the more to find grounds for it. 'For,' he wrote, 'the clarity and firmness (of religion and revelation) ever increase when true knowledge increases . . . and every new truth . . . may throw light on the Christian Religion, of all truths the first and the last.' The final draft of his work was published only towards the end of a lifetime spent in testing this maxim in practice.

He had a varied life and made friends with many famous contemporaries. Son of a country clergyman, he also originally intended taking orders. But scruples about subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles prevented him, and he became a doctor instead. At Cambridge he took the usual course in Classics, Divinity and Mathematics, and became deeply immersed in and affected by all the works—both scientific and theological—of Sir Isaac Newton. After taking his M.A., he held a fellowship at Jesus College and started to study medicine. It was at this time that he made an important and lasting friendship with Edmund Law, whose translation of King's *Origin of Evil*, with its preface by Gay, first set him thinking out the wide implications of the association of ideas. Wishing to marry, he vacated his fellowship after a year and became a schoolmaster at Newark through the influence of Warburton, the religious historian. Soon after, he proceeded to a medical practice at Bury St. Edmunds, and here his wife died in giving birth to a son. The great sorrow this caused him gave rise to a fierce wrestle with religious doubt—but he ended victorious. Eventually he married again and went to London, where he practised his craft in both high and lowly society and became intimate with several famous men: Butler of *The Analogy of Religion*; Byrom, inventor of shorthand; physicians such as Sir Hans Sloane, James Jurin and Cheselden; the whig Bishop Hoadley; the Roman Catholic historian Hooke, and many others. Later, he corresponded with Joseph Priestley, the scientist and 'dissenter'. He lent his sympathy to all and took all opinions seriously—sometimes too seriously—even if he did

[1] *Conjecturae de Sensu* i.e. *Motu et Idearum Generatione.*

not agree with them. For, unlike many of his friends, he abhorred detraction in controversy. He ended his days at Bath, where he moved for the sake of his wife's health. There he continued his medical practice and finally published his great work, winning general esteem. After his death he was described in a local paper as 'the friendly Samaritan'.

His scruples on the subject of the Articles were caused not so much by doubts about the doctrine of the Trinity, such as worried some of his contemporaries, but about the general principle of adherence to credal forms: especially when 'everlasting fire' was held out as an alternative. He had questioned the value of words in fixing articles of belief ever since he began to think about the origin and development of language. 'Words,' he wrote later,[2] 'refer to words, and to grammatical and logical analogies, in an endless manner in these things (creeds, etc.), and all the real foundation which we have is the words of Scripture, and of the most ancient writers, considered as helps not authorities . . . It seems . . . ensnaring to subscribe even to the scriptures themselves, if to any particular canon, copy, etc., because of the many real doubts in these things . . . Yet still it appears to me incontestable that no careful impartial enquirer can doubt of the great truths of the scriptures, such as the miraculous birth, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ, and of the practical consequence thence arising . . . and surely it cannot be necessary to believe more.' 'Real doubts in these things' did not, however, prevent Hartley from remaining not merely a member of the Church of England but a constant communicant all his life.

He is chiefly famous for the elaboration of Associations, and in fact is regarded as the founder of that famous doctrine. His originality in this field lay in the fact that he studied the subject through the observation of behaviour rather than introspection, and attempted to correlate it with the findings of physiology. He came to believe that all mental activity was caused by vibrations in the nerve fibres of the brain. Incoming sensations in these set up vibrationary 'Dispositions' which caused them, by repetition and mutual association, to form habits, memory and ratiocinations according to the multitudinous forms in which they were modified. From these primary vibrations of sensation there arose 'vibratiuncles' or miniature vibrations giving rise to ideas: either directly 'of sensation' or indirectly—through other ideas—'of intellect'. All mental processes therefore were regarded as mechanical and dependent upon each other for their operation. There remained the question: *whence* came the original sensation or inspiration? This is where theological considerations come in.

The passage about 'inspiration' in the 'Observations' occurs in the chapter on 'The Intellectual Faculties of Brutes'. Hartley conjectured

[2] *Obs. on M.* (1791 ed.), p. 514.

that animals' brains were moved far less than those of men by 'intellectual ideas'. For they had less room in their smaller brains for vibratiuncles, and hence for the interconnection of sensations and association of ideas; also they made little use of symbols in their language. Instead the 'dispositions to miniature vibrations' in animals' nervous systems might, he suggested, be caused by changes in their own bodies as from maturation of seasonal disturbances, etc., which often did not reach the central brain but effected just the cerebellum or spinal nerves. This, he felt, might explain instinct, which he called 'a kind of inspiration'. It was also inspiration which gave ideas to 'sacred writers'. But sacred inspiration impressed the brain from 'a much higher source, so as to be termed supernatural properly, in contradistinction to all knowledge resulting from the common laws of nature'. We may presume that he means by this that the stimulus of inspiration might come into the brain direct from God, as it were, and apart from ordinary sensory human experience. Nevertheless, he continues: 'sacred inspiration would lose nothing of its authority though it should appear to be within such laws, as by their fixedness might be termed nature: and indeed all differences in these things, after the facts are once settled, will be found, upon due enquiry, to be merely verbal'.[3]

Nature, to Hartley, was largely a matter of consistencies, but since it belonged to a God-created totality, man's experience of it depended upon a Purpose beyond himself and which could only fully operate in his consciousness 'preternaturally . . . through prayer, reading the scriptures or in religious contemplation'. The mechanisms of this process were material and real; God was immaterial but no less real. The relation between the two would *always be speculative* because finite beings, though they could develop a real idea of things infinite, could never conceive these except in relation to themselves.

Hartley's arguments upon the 'Being and Attributes of God' and upon 'Natural' Religion were based largely upon those of Locke, Newton and Butler. But we may note the following divergences:

First of all he was at more pains to point out how 'factitious' or incomplete was our idea of God. Being constructed out of the association of intellectual ideas, it was, with these, based upon the sum of our experience, and this could not include all possible experience. But it might include more than the sum of our sense data: more even than Locke's 'Intuitive Knowledge', and it could be quickened deliberately through such things as prayer, suffering and the 'Word' of Christ. For Hartley's religion pre-supposed free will 'in the popular sense'—that is, power to turn our actions and affections to God once given the motive to do so—but it did not involve free will 'in the philosophical sense'—that is, the

[3] *Obs.* p. 244.

power of doing different things when previous circumstances, such as motives and dispositions, remained the same. This distinction between 'popular' and 'philosophical' free will was peculiar to Hartley. As for the 'Freedom of God', though he admitted that God had no 'compelling cause', yet to suppose that he had free will in the philosophical or popular sense was to commit 'the grossest anthropomorphism'.[4] In contrast to King (*Origin of Evil*), Hartley stressed the fact that man could possess no principle of action independently of God.

Secondly, Hartley's theory of evil, though scarcely original, is worth quoting for his peculiar way of putting it. Evil, he considered, was the result of our 'misapprehension of the parts' of creation or failure to apprehend God's scheme as a whole; and he elaborated this theme thus: there was a progress for us—on which all our true happiness depended—towards the Love of God. This we might attain only through (*a*) fear of God, (*b*) idolatry of external things and (*c*) idolatry of ourselves. Yet all these, while they predominated in this life, barred us from the Love of God! Only when fear of God was used to turn us from the other idolatries could we find, out of this very fear, the Love of God. The scholium followed that if W = Love of the World and F = Fear of God and L = Love of God, then since W : F : : F : L, $W = \frac{F^2}{L}$! This surprising piece of mathematics he elaborated to show that the diminution of W must lead to the increase of L, and that beyond a certain point F must disappear as well as W in favour of L.[5]

When he tried to establish the truth of Christian 'Revelation' as distinct from 'Natural Religion', Hartley's arguments leant heavily upon the perilous erudition of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. The reliability and truth of the Old and New Testament were for him clinched by the laborious calculations of Newton's *Chronology*. So, for instance, he took it as fully established that the Jews were the first people to inhabit the earth, and certainly the first to create a civilisation. He might perhaps have given more heed to the writings of his friend Warburton, who at least, in *The Divine Legation of Moses*, kept an eye on Herodotus in the course of his studies of the Old Testament. With Whiston, however, Hartley admitted that the Fall of Adam might be allegorical and that the six days of creation must have covered a period longer than the eighteenth-century week. His belief in the universal destruction by the Flood was tempered by the concession that one or two peaks in the Andes may have escaped the deluge, thus accounting for some animals which were not recognizable descendants of those succoured by Noah!

[4] *Obs.* p. 329. Date given for this word in O.E.D. = 1753.
[5] *Obs.* p. 501.

Discussing miracles, Hartley developed a theory of belief which emphasized his awareness of the subjectivity of perception. We must, he said, live by our unverified beliefs, for mere knowledge of the consequences which followed from the general laws of matter could not yet carry us far enough even for simple rational behaviour. We had thus developed the habit of relying on common assent in order to judge what was 'agreeable to nature'. Even our personal experience could not be relied on further. For instance, we might suppose some forms of motion impossible because of our experience of the law of gravity, while the discovery of electrical and magnetic effects would belie this impossibility. So it were as reasonable to believe in the witness of accumulated Christian writings as in that of our own eyes. In the same way, since we could and did assent only by association—that is, 'analogy perfect or imperfect'—it would be a 'miracle in the human mind' to suppose that so many Jews and Christians bore testimony to miracles unless these had really been performed. Moreover, our very knowledge of the Love of God might be said to come to us miraculously. For though it reached us through the natural channel of the 'moral sense', we could only apprehend it through divine inspiration and teaching. And we could only act upon it when our spiritual consciousness of Christ should 'break our wills'. The fact that an event appeared miraculous at one time did not preclude the possibility of its later explanation by physical laws. Meanwhile, the congruity of various experiences would point ever more surely to the same end as the Revelation of Christ.

Hartley's 'Rule of Life' was to be guided by the precepts 'benevolence, piety and the moral sense'. It had, in fact, much analogous to Butler's enthronement of conscience. But Hartley's 'moral sense' was more directly divine than Butler's 'conscience'. For Hartley, conscience was the 'tool' of the moral sense which was religion's 'advisor'. The one kept our faculties in their most effective state of 'moderate application', while the other showed us that the powers of these faculties were derived from God. If we followed the 'advisor' and used the 'tool', then the 'pleasures of Theopathy' would enable us to recreate our motives and set our minds on true joys.

His 'Rule of Faith' depended on prayer: the 'action of religion'. For faith, he said, involved the 'right disposition of mind' and needed the training of concentration upon God. We must first develop an attitude prepared to accept knowledge of Christ's Gospel and to act upon it. Then we could add 'historical and speculative faith' which, though necessary, was not of itself sufficient. No one should be forced to subscribe to a creed.

Concerning man's 'Expectations', Hartley's ideas were filled with eighteenth-century optimism. Happiness was to predominate through an inevitable progress towards virtue, since our errors should, by the associa-

tion of ideas, teach us the proper lessons eventually. But ultimate happiness could never be achieved in this world, which gave us hope that by God's justice and mercy it was to be looked for in the next. Indeed, our present earthly existence, he supposed, would surely end in the fire foretold by ancient prophecy. That was to be after the overthrow of all civil governments, the dissolution of all church organization, the return of the Jews to the Holy Land and the preaching of Christianity to all nations!

As regards the immateriality and immortality of the soul, Hartley allowed that there might be 'an immaterial substance . . . between sensation and the material organs', or possibly an 'immaterial body' to contain the soul after death 'until the resurrection'. For 'all the apparatus which carries us from body to mind and mind to God and which the doctrine of association opens to view' was an argument that the ends and purposes of life were to be fulfilled after death.

Physiology, psychology and history have acquired new understanding since Hartley's day, and the bases of his 'doctrine of Association' no longer hold and no longer provide quite the same grounds for faith which Hartley saw in them. Nevertheless, his method of approaching the study of man through physiology, coupled, as it was, with an awareness of the significance of prayer in the apprehension of spiritual truth, is one which can still contribute to an enlargement of religious interest.

REVIEWS

THE PRIMACY OF PETER*

It has not always been easy to review the volumes in this series. Apologetics and scholarship seldom go together. Even though scholars of many Christian traditions are now contributing, there has at times been a hint of anxiety to demonstrate to the English-speaking world that Roman Catholics could be good Patristic scholars. There has been too, a certain virtuosity in the choice of works to be translated, while on the other hand, time and effort have been wasted in editing yet again well commented works which are readily available to students. All in all, it has been difficult to see exactly what audience the editors have had in mind. The extent of critical apparatus has rendered many of the volumes well-nigh incomprehensible to all but scholars completely versed in the theme, while failure to print the original text as well as a translation has limited their value even to them. Nonetheless, the series has produced some notable contributions to scholarship. Among these are J. N. D. Kelly's edition of Rufinus' *Commentary on the Apostles' Creed* (Vol. 20), Professor Waszink's edition of Tertullian's *Treatise against Hermogenes* (Vol. 24) and J. H. Crehan, S.J.'s Athenagoras, *Embassy for the Christians* (Vol. 23). These are examples of what can be achieved by appointing scholars of differing religious traditions to work in their own field.

The foregoing remarks apply with some force to Fr. M. Bévenot's edition of Cyprian's *De Lapsis* and *De Unitate*. The scholarship is there but so also is the Roman Catholic apologetic. In this case an impartial approach coupled with an imaginative grasp of African Christianity in the third and fourth centuries was essential to success. For a quarter of a century now Fr. Bévenot has made the writings of Cyprian his special field and he has concentrated his attention on the *De Unitate*. Cyprian, it will be remembered, wrote this work probably in the autumn of 251 in support of Cornelius against Novatian, the rival claimant to the Roman See. It was designed to impress his congregation at Carthage of the enormity of Novatian's action, but a copy was also sent to Rome. (See Cyprian, *Ep.* 54.4, Hartel, 623). The stress throughout is on the need for Christian unity. Christ founded only one Church, and to leave that was a breach of charity for which not even martyrdom atoned. Dreadful examples drawn from the Old Testament proved the wickedness of revolt against God's priests.

This simple, hard-hitting tract contains, however, a real problem in Ch. 4 and the first five lines of Ch. 5. There are two rival versions which have become intermingled in different MSS. (Here is the most obvious example of the need of publishing the Latin texts as well as the translation.) Cyprian is arguing that Christ founded the Church on one man, St. Peter, and hence that heresies and schisms were the work of the Devil. He quotes Matt. xvi: 18 and thereafter the two texts diverge. In the shorter text, known as the Primacy Text, the writer goes on to quote the first three words of Jo. xxi: 17, and then, while conceding that authority was given to all the apostles emphasizes that 'the primacy was given to Peter', and that 'if a man does not hold fast to this oneness of Peter does he imagine that he still holds the faith?' If he deserts the chair (*cathedram*) of Peter upon which the Church is built, has he still confidence that he is in the Church?' The second text, the Received Text, omits the reference to Jo.

**Ancient Christian Writers,* Vol. XXV. St. Cyprian. *The Lapsed,* and *The Unity of the Catholic Church,* translated and annotated by Maurice Bévenot, S.J., pp. 133+vi (Longmans, 1957; 21s.).

xxi : 17, and though it opens with the statement that the Church 'had its origin in one man alone in order to show that the Church of Christ is unique', uses this argument to emphasize the importance of unity within the episcopate as a whole. There is no question but that the Received Text is Cyprianic. The vocabulary and texts cited (*Canticles* vi : 8, 'One is my dove . . .' and *Eph.*, iv : 4 'One body and one Spirit . . .') are quoted time and again by Cyprian and his colleagues, particularly during the Baptismal controversy five years later. Bévenot, to whom the major credit of unravelling the texts belongs, has always argued against critics who saw the Primacy Text as a Roman interpolation, that it represented Cyprian's original view, which he modified during the Baptismal controversy. (See M. Bévenot, St. Cyprian's *De Unitate,* 1938, p. 64). In his present work he has given further deep thought to the problem and has reached the interesting conclusion that 'speaking of the "primacy of Peter" or of "the Chair of Peter" Cyprian was not thinking specifically of *Rome* but literally of Peter and of the *unity* which Christ intended for His Church when He founded it on Peter, and which Novatian was destroying. That unity was constituted simply by the unity of the bishops among themselves' (p. 6, Itals. in text). The text, however, was altered during the Baptismal controversy, '*not* because he had changed his mind about the Papacy, but because Rome was reading more into it than he intended' (p. 7, Itals. in text).

The first of these conclusions seems perhaps to go too far. It is not much later that Cyprian writes to Cornelius and identifies unmistakably the *Cathedram Petri* with Rome (Ep. 59.14, Hartel, 683). One has the feeling as one studies Bévenot's contributions that the intense concentration that he has devoted to the textual problems of the *De Unitate* may perhaps have blinded him to their context in the general history of North African Christianity. One turns to T. G. Jalland's *The Church and Papacy* (S.P.C.K., 1944) 161-168 for the clear summary of Cyprian's view of the 'primatus Petri' which one would have liked to find in Bévenot's latest work. One is surprised that he does not refer to this book.

Surely the real clue to the understanding of Chs. 4 and 5 of the *De Unitate* is to be found in the significance which Cyprian's predecessors and successors attached to the 'claves Petri' and 'cathedra Petri'. How were the apostles SS. Peter and Paul regarded in North Africa? These seem to be the obvious questions which anyone making a detailed study of Cyprianic texts must ask himself at the outset. Yet, one looks in vain for a discussion of Tertullian's or Parmenian's doctrine of the Church, and in particular, no use seems to have been made at any time of Pincherle's basic article in this connection, 'L'Ecclesiologia nella Controversia donatista' (*Ricerche religiose* i, 1925).

Without going into detail, it is clear for instance, that Tertullian regarded the 'keys of Peter' as symbolising the birthright of every true Christian, 'which every single person who has been questioned and conferred will take with him' (*Scorpiace,* 10).

This is not the only time that African theologians think of Peter in connection with martyrdom. In the *De Pudicitia* written perhaps against Callistus of Rome (218-222) Tertullian appears to regard Peter as standing for the Church as a whole with whom the existing incumbent of the Roman bishopric had no necessary link (*De Pudicitia* 21). At the other end of the scale, in the 360's, much of the controversy between Parmenian (Donatist bishop of Carthage) and Optatus of Milevis turned precisely on the interpretation of these same terms. It is remarkable that it is the Donatists who quote the *De Unitate* and base their theology of the Church on symbolism derived from it. To Parmenian, the 'claves Petri' and 'Cathedra Petri' stand for the 'endowments' (*dotes*) of the true Church as Bride of Christ, which the Catholics had lost through apostacy during the Great Persecution. 'Only Peter has the keys' (Optatus, *De*

Schismate, i.10. Ziwsa, 12), Parmenian argued. The contrast is with heretics and schismatics just as in the *De Unitate*. Here may, perhaps, be an unexpected clue as to what Cyprian really meant, for the Donatists based themselves scrupulously on his theology. Throughout the controversy with the African Catholics they were very careful to maintain a link with Rome through a succession of Donatist bishops, though these were considered lower in dignity than the Donatist Primates of Carthage and Numidia. And, they regarded the founders of the Roman See in the first instance as martyrs. (Frend, *Journ. Rom. Studies,* xxx, 1940, 31-48, and *The Donatist Church,* 164). It is interesting too, that Optatus does not introduce the Roman See in his immediate reply to Parmenian. Indeed, he accepts the drift of his opponent's argument ('bene revocasti claves ad Petrum', *De Schismate,* i.12) and goes on to argue against the legitimacy of Donatism on the basis of historical facts (*De Schismate* i.13 ff.).

Perhaps, from the rather scanty evidence available, it is possible to see how the African Church both before and after Cyprian interpreted the 'primacy of Peter' as a symbol of Church unity centred in Rome where St. Peter and St. Paul had suffered martyrdom, but without reference to the rights of any particular holder of the See. Certainly, questions of jurisdiction were far from their minds. Indeed, they were from anybody's until in 341 Constantius roused the latent hostility of the Western Church to Imperial jurisdiction, and the Patriarch of the West was the obvious substitute for the appellate jurisdiction of the Emperor in major ecclesiastical issues. Cyprian, regarding Tertullian as 'his master', and revered by his Donatist successors may be expected to conform to African tradition. It is only in this context that the problems raised by the *De Unitate* can be satisfactorily studied.

It would perhaps be imprudent to raise the ghost of the interpolation theory, but there are three points which Bénevot might consider,

(*a*) The lack of contemporary evidence either on the part of Pontius, Cyprian's biographer, his opponents, or his own letters for a *volte-face* in regard to the Papacy. On what contemporary texts does Bénevot base his view that 'Rome was reading more into the *De Unitate* that he intended?' Are the meagre references to *Ep.* 71.3 and *Ep.* 75.17 the last word? Indeed the latter, written by Firmilian, supports the case for a Roman interpolation.

(*b*) That the existence of rival texts in Africa in the fourth century would have given Donatist and Catholic propagandists a splendid chance of accusing each other of forging Cyprian's works. Chances of this sort were not let slip (see Augustine, *Retract,* 1.21). Both sides used the *De Unitate*.[1] Yet, our very full literary remains on the controversy are silent.

(*c*) The problem of 'Pasce oves meas' in the Primacy Text. This is not used again by Cyprian, so far as the reviewer knows, and Cyprian liked to re-iterate his favourite texts. It is, however, used by the Roman clergy in their letter to their opposite numbers at Carthage in 250 (Cyprian, *Ep.* 8.1, Hartel, 486). And, Cyprian sent a copy of the *De Unitate* to Rome. One would not have to wait two centuries for a 'modification'. Most strikingly, Optatus does not use this quotation against the Donatists, which he might have been expected to do if he had the Primacy Text in front of him. This could be accounted for if the latter were not known in Africa at this period (360-380). Surely Bénevot does not ask us to believe that Cyprian disliked the text because it 'would be misused against him' (*JTS, N.S.v.*, 1954, 34).

Bénevot's translation and commentary on the *De Lapsis* raises fewer problems, and will be greatly welcomed. This is the sort of job one would like to see done more often in this series, for here is an interesting and important work of which there is no

[1]For Augustine's use of Chs. 4 and 5 see the important article by O. Perler, 'Le De Unitate de S. Cyprien utilisé par S. Augustin', *Augustinus Magister,* Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, 1954, 835-858.

up-to-date English translation. The notes on the practice of penance in the African Church are extremely useful, and the editing and translation is scholarly throughout. A real need has been met.

Despite criticisms—and in a review criticisms are often a compliment—this is a valuable piece of work. It is thorough, well-written and intelligible to the general reader. The main faults lie in the narrowness of approach (has Bénevot, for instance, ever been to North Africa and studied African Christianity on the ground?) and the tendency to lapse into apologetic. To assert, for instance, as a main conclusion, 'that Cyprian is a standing example of what we mean when we speak of the Roman Primacy being "implicit" in the early Church' (p. 8) is nonsense, if Bénevot now considers that the Primacy Text does not refer to Rome at all. As one reads the scrupulously balanced sentences of the introduction and in the notes one sometimes feels that in this work Bénevot the scholar is at grips with Bénevot the Jesuit priest. One wishes he had stuck to the language of his notable *JTS* article.[2] Nonetheless, his is another excellent contribution to the study of Cyprian. The notes contain a mine of useful information, and on the subject of African Church practices this work will long be a useful guide for further study.

W. H. C. Frend

ENCYCLOPAEDIA ECCLESIASTICA*

Both the Oxford University Press and Dr. Cross, the editor, deserve the congratulations of all churchmen, especially those connected with Christian education, on the production of this dictionary. To quote the preface, 'it is addressed to the reading public as a whole'. In an age when so many know so little about the faith they profess a copy should find its way certainly to the library of every secondary school and if possible to every Christian educated family. Its scope is so wide that entries range from Graffiti to Rousseau. It contains over 6,000 entries and nearly 4,500 bibliographies. The aim of the dictionary has been to provide the facts of the Christian tradition recorded in their historical context and treated in an impartial manner. So far as a perusal of a random selection of entries affords adequate evidence that purpose seems to have been achieved. Where there is so much to admire it seems churlish to criticise but it is only fair to record that entries on controversial issues sometimes appear to be coloured by the Anglican fashion of the times. For instance the entry on matrimony omits to record that all the Protestant churches outside the Anglican communion tolerate and recognise divorce and that ever since the Reformation there has been within the Established Church a respectable body of opinion represented by Cosin, Tait, and Creighton which has recognised divorce and tolerated the remarriage of divorced persons. The entry on the Modern Churchmen's Union contains the vague and misleading statement that its policy has been marked by hostility (esp. latterly) to socialistic programmes of reform in Church or State. It is true that the leaders of the Union refused to ally themselves with what may be termed the programmes of C.O.P.E.C. in 1924 and the Malvern conference in 1943. It would be more accurate to record that while the Union was unanimous in condemning plain injustice wherever it occurred it was left to the members themselves to support each what he thought best in the way of political and social reform. That alone makes it possible to name such men as W. R. Inge and E. W. Barnes as leaders of the movement. The entry 'Josephus' makes no mention of the discovery of the Slavonic Josephus and the problems it has raised. In spite of these blemishes which are in a large measure the fruit of

[2]M. Bénevot, 'Primatus Petro datur', St. Cyprian on the Papacy. *Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S.V., 1954, 19-35, particularly pp. 34-35.

**The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, edited by F. L. Cross, D.D. (O.U.P., price 70s.).

current prejudices the dictionary should prove for all active and thinking churchmen a necessary and trustworthy book of reference in this Alexandrine age.

H.C.S.

THE CHURCH MILITANT*

This book is made up of three lectures given at Chelmsford Cathedral in 1954 (one of them an essay published in 1954), to which is added one new chapter, together with a reprint of an article published in 1956, and essays on J. N. Figgis (based on a previously published article) and William Temple (this latter being a lecture given at Canterbury in 1956). It is wise, therefore, to regard the book as a series of loosely connected essays round one theme. That theme is one that, as Mr. Reckitt says, he has been hammering home for some forty years, namely the social and corporate aspects of the Christian faith and responsibilities of the Christian Church, and the folly of thinking of Christianity in a purely personal and individualistic way, and of exhausting the contribution of Christianity to the body politic in the production of consecrated individuals. Those who know Mr. Reckitt's writing will not find anything new here. Those who do not will find he has a most readable and lively style. Many will think it is rather late in the day to be emphasising these points. Mr. Reckitt, contemplating the level of understanding of the average P.C.C. or the activities of Billy Graham, thinks not. Certainly he should be able to persuade a well educated Church goer who has an appreciation of English style, for whom the essays were presumably written. And he is a powerful enemy of cynicism or despair.

With regard to the further implications of Mr. Reckitt's thought there is reason for caution. In particular his use of the terms 'natural' and 'unnatural' requires scrutiny, as does his understanding of certain economic processes. In these and other respects these essays would benefit from closer engagement with that of other theological thought on these matters within the ecumenical movement. Their social background is also too restricted to England. Our problems themselves get out of focus unless seen in a wider setting. There again more awareness of ecumenical thought would help. But these matters are only in the background of the book, otherwise it would be necessary to criticise them more closely. Mr. Reckitt keeps his main target well in the foreground and hits it hard.

RONALD PRESTON

6th August, 1957.

**Militant Here in Earth*, by Maurice B. Reckitt, pp. 160 (Longmans; 9s. 6d.).

KIERKEGAARD AGAIN*

A multitude of books and articles have been written in recent years on Kierkegaard; and many of them are listed with comments at the end of this volume, and quoted in its text. In this book the writer concentrates on a single main theme, the thesis that 'truth is subjectivity'. For the elucidation of this theme, he says in the preface that Cambridge gave him what he regards 'as the most useful way of interpreting Kierkegaard—that is the attempt to translate his thought by means of the linguistic technique'. In fact the book covers a wider ground than this might suggest. The opening chapters discuss Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel and to the disciples and critics of Hegel. Later chapters develop Kierkegaard's own thought under the headings, 'The Principal of Subjectivity', 'The Existence of God', and 'The Absolute Paradox'.

The result is an interesting and penetrating, yet difficult and in some ways rather unsatisfactory treatment. Truth is subjectivity; yet in the historical section the author

looks for analogies and sources with great learning, but with a subtlety which seems at times scarcely to allow Kierkegaard to live and think for himself. 'Religion is not a form of doctrine but a way of life.' 'Faith is living or it is nothing'. Yet the attempt to expound such statements by linguistic analysis seems at times to leave us hovering on the brink, discussing the language of faith, rather than taking that leap of decision, without which according to Kierkegaard there can be no faith.

For those who are already students of Kierkegaard, this book will provide valuable and stimulating comments to clarify its central theme. For those who are students of linguistic analysis the book, if they will read it, may show that they have more in common with Kierkegaard, and perhaps more to learn from him, than they supposed. For the ordinary reader, who like the reviewer would not claim an expert knowledge in either field, the book will serve its purpose, if it leads them on to some of the broader and simpler studies listed in the bibliography, or better still to the works of Kierkegaard himself.

G.F.A.

*J. Heywood Thomas: *Subjectivity and Paradox*. A Study of Kierkegaard. pp. viii+174 (Basil Blackwell; 18s.).

ST. PAUL FOR SCHOOLS*

These three books are all suitable for the school library, and the first for the college library. The commentary on the epistle to the Romans will be useful for sixth-form pupils, teachers and students, who require a concise treatment of the theology and structure of the epistle and its place in the framework of Paul's life and thought. The new translation by Dr. Barrett is particularly pleasing and helpful to the general reader who wishes to grasp the significance of this basic document for Christian theology. The short study of St. Paul by Canon Luce is excellent for its size and deserves its place in this series. He provides an elementary introduction to St. Paul's life and work: the book is mainly to be recommended to teachers in the junior forms of secondary schools, the senior forms of primary schools as well as Sunday school teachers. There is much to stimulate and grip the reader in this book.

The Man from Tarsus, by H. F. A. Eurich will also help middle and senior pupils to gain a living picture of St. Paul and the early Christian communities with which he was connected. The author makes use of the imagination which he skilfully weaves with the historic facts recorded in the Acts and the Epistles. The result is a new appreciation of the character and work of St. Paul and a fascinating reconstruction of his ministry and teaching, which will both edify and excite the reader. The author has certainly dispelled dullness and boredom from the study of St. Paul.

R. W. J. Bevan

**The Epistle to the Romans,* by C. K. Barrett (A. & C. Black's New Testament Commentaries). Price 25s.
**St. Paul,* by H. K. Luce (A. & C. Black 'Lives to Remember' series). Price 6s. 6d.
**The Man from Tarsus,* by H. F. A. Eurich (Montgomeryshire Printing Co., Newtown).

ADVENTURE IN SEARCH OF A CREED*

Dr. Happold takes his reader in search of a *Credo* which shall be 'an answer which satisfies a man's deepest nature, to those fundamental questions which from the beginning men have asked: What am I? Whence did I come; whither am I going? What is the nature of the universe? What is the meaning of existence, of human history and of the little "me" which is a part, however insignificant a part, of that history? Is there any meaning in it all? Or is there only a chance combina-

*By F. C. Happold. (Faber & Faber, 1957, 15/-; 215 pp.)

tion of atoms, without ultimate purpose or significance? Is there some Power behind phenomena and, if so, is It friendly or hostile or indifferent?' So Dr. Happold seeks for a world-view, for what Whitehead called a scheme of ideas by which we can unflinchingly explore the universe around us.

In the earlier chapters, Dr. Happold shows us how recent years have brought about a remarkable transformation of those world views which have hitherto been associated respectively with a scientific and a historical approach. It is surely significant (says the author) that as scientists 'have delved more deeply into the nature of the material universe, their discoveries have compelled them to accept concepts and use language so similar to the concepts and language of those who have penetrated most deeply into the secrets of the world of spirit'. Likewise the historian, 'aware of the extent to which his cultural and religious outlook and predisposition are coloured and conditioned by his being born a twentieth-century western European man', will conclude that it is 'unlikely that it has been given to western European man to express the whole truth about the nature of God or to say the last word about human history'. So the historian will endeavour 'to see beyond the horizon' of his inherited world and by a flight of the imagination, supported by intellectual humility and a deep charity, he will endeavour to penetrate to 'the totality of the experience and insights of the human race'. There is, then, at present not only the need but also the opportunity to work out a satisfying scheme of ideas—for we have been forced from the restrictive limitations both of a scientific rigidity and a historical parochialism. We are encouraged in our intellectual adventures by the scientist and historian alike. In different ways they help us on our journey. What then of the scheme of ideas Dr. Happold seeks to commend to us?

It will be built (he says) on the broadest experience of men, and in this way cannot even be restricted to the themes of a single religion. It will, in particular, do justice to what both the psychologist and the mystic have to tell us. It will link the natural and the supernatural. It may well look back to some 'vivid and significant experience' as that which determines 'the nature of the . . . primary act of intellectual faith'; and in Chapter XIV the author recalls with impressive sincerity such a significant experience in his own life.

At the same time, it will acknowledge that there must always be a lack of 'fit' between any scheme of ideas and that 'totality of experience' which the scheme tries to map. In particular, we must not attribute qualities to God 'in the sense they might be attributed to a human being . . . To do so is to extend the possibility of an affirmation about the Unknowable further than it will legitimately go. It is to be guilty of confusing concepts, drawn from sense experience, with symbols.' 'What we . . . need is a language which can be so extended as to make it possible for us to speak coherently about the noumenal world. Even though we may be fully convinced of its reality, it is by no means certain that we can discourse about it in intelligible and meaningful terms. The "secret" language about which I have spoken may be intelligible to some; to others it is meaningless; and it is sadly lacking in precision.' He suggests that perhaps 'by correlating the language of psychology and the symbolism of the mystics a coherent and understandable means of communication may be evolved'.

Here is a book ranging over wide themes, combining generous sympathies with an honest searching after truth; and written in a vigorous and lively style. The author writes with the vision and enthusiasm of the prophet, and brings both sensibility and faith to bear on diverse themes as we accompany him on his adventure in search of a *Credo*.

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